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REGULATORY EXEMPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS
BEHAVIOR AND THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING

OF THE

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Douglas Laycock*
INTRODUCTION

The Symposium that includes this Article proclaims a "(re)turn
to history" in religious liberty law. I doubt that we were ever away
from history. Church-state relations were a much contested issue at
the time of the American Founding, and those debates left an unusually thick record. All sides in modem debates have mined that record,
however selectively, for evidence of original understanding.
One side cites Madison and Jefferson; the other side cites the defenders of the established church. One side cites the decision to end
direct financial support of churches; the other side cites congressional
chaplains and religious rhetoric by politicians and government offi© 2006 Douglas Laycock. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. I wrote
this article in the midst of my transition from The University of Texas to The
University of Michigan, so I was able to use two great libraries. Of course I lacked the
time to exhaust the resources of either. I am grateful toJamie Richards at Texas for
research assistance, to Aimee Mangan and the research staff in Michigan's law library
for help finding colonial sources, and to participants in the Columbia Law School
Workshop on Legal Theory for comments and questions that were both challenging
and helpful. A special thank you toJ. William Frost, Professor Emeritus of Religion at
Swarthmore College, who volunteered to check sources at the Swarthmore library on
my behalf.
I have examined original sources wherever possible, but I benefited enormously
from the work of other scholars who had already examined those sources with
somewhat different questions in mind-especiallyJ. William Frost, Philip Hamburger,
Richard K. MacMaster, and Ellis West. I have retained the original spelling from the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth-century sources except where I had to rely on
a compilation or reprint that had modernized spelling.
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cials. At least in political and judicial debates, neither side makes
much effort to take account of the evidence offered by the other side,
or to craft a theory that explains why the Founders accepted government support of religion in some contexts and not in others.
The claims that nonpreferential aid is permitted, or that noncoercive aid is permitted, fit modem agendas much better than they fit
eighteenth-century practice. Not all forms of government support for
religion were controversial in the late eighteenth century, but once a
form of support became controversial, making it nonpreferential or
even noncoercive did not end the controversy.' A better first approximation is that the Founders prohibited forms of support that were
controversial among Protestants; government financial support for
churches was controversial in the eighteenth century, but nonfinancial support did not become controversial until the nineteenth century, when Catholic immigration expanded the range of religious
2
pluralism and thus the range of controversy.
The use of history has been selective not just in the sense that
each side prefers its own half of history, but also in the sense that
some prominent history is invoked repeatedly, and other history, less
widely known, is largely ignored. Both sides in the Supreme Court
give much attention to the late eighteenth century but very little to
the nineteenth-century Protestant-Catholic battles over public schools,
although those battles are the true origin of modern controversies
over both financial aid to private schools and religious observance in
public schools. 3 The Court has long debated Establishment Clause
issues in originalist terms, 4 but it rewrote the law of free exercise with1 See generally Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False
Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37 (1991) [hereinafter Laycock,
"Noncoercive" Support] (rejecting the theory that the Founders were concerned only
with coercive government support for religion); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"
Aid to Religion: A False Claim About OriginalIntent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986)
[hereinafter Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid] (rejecting the theory that the Founders
were concerned only with support that preferred one or some denominations over
others).
2 See Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid, supra note 1, at 913-19.
3 SeeJohn C. Jefferies, Jr. & James E.Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REX,. 279, 297-305 (2001); Douglas Laycock, Church and State in
the United States: Competing Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming Aug. 2006); Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation,70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1667, 1682 (2003) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE (2002)).
4 See, e.g.,
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947) (relying on the history
of disestablishment in America, and especially in Virginia); id. at 33-43 (Rutledge,J.,
dissenting) (same); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
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out a glance at original understanding. 5 When scholars began providing the historical evidence on free exercise, 6 each side on the Court
predictably adopted the evidence that supported the position it had
already taken. 7 The Court endlessly debates what the framers of the
First Amendment thought about establishment, but it shows no interest in what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought about
establishment, although it is the Fourteenth Amendment that applies
in most of its cases. 8 The Court is reasonably familiar with late
eighteenth-century evidence on funding and religious speech by government officials, 9 but often it addresses newly emerging issues with
little awareness of historical evidence that might be relevant.
This Article addresses one such underexamined issue. Some opponents of regulatory exemptions for religious practice claim that exemptions prefer religion and thus violate the Establishment Clause.
This claim is inconsistent with the original understanding. There is
much originalist debate about whether the founding generation unsenting) (relying on debates in the First Congress and the history of government support for religion).
5 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6 Compare Philip A. Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemption: An
HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) (arguing that the original understanding offers no support for a free exercise right to regulatory exemptions), with
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HAR-v. L. REv. 1409 (1990) (arguing that the original understanding is somewhat supportive of such a right).
7 Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537-44 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that historical evidence supports Employment Div. v. Smith), and Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 (Scalia, J.) (holding that governmentimposed burdens on religious practice require no justification if imposed by neutral
and generally applicable law), with Boerne, 521 U.S. at 548-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that historical evidence is inconsistent with Smith), and Smith, 494 U.S.
at 892-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting Smith's rule and arguing that all
government-imposed burdens on religious practice require compelling justification).
8 For nineteenth-century developments in disestablishment, see Kurt T. Lash,
The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle,
27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1100-54 (1995). I do not subscribe to Lash's federalism interpretation of the Establishment Clause as of 1791, but that disagreement must await
another day.
9 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2882-88 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (conceding history of religious statements by federal officials and providing
additional context); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748-50,
2753-55 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reviewing history of religious statements by
federal officials); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
852-60 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (reviewing Founding-era opposition to funding of churches); id. at 868-72 (Souter,J., dissenting) (same); see also cases cited supra
note 4.
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derstood regulatory exemptions to be constitutionally required.1 0 But
there is virtually no evidence that anyone thought they were constitutionally prohibited or that they were part of an establishment of religion. The established church had no need for exemptions, because its
teachings were in accord with government policy. Exemptions protect
minority religions, and they emerged only in the wake of toleration of
dissenting worship. Exemptions are subject to limits in specific cases;
they cannot prefer particular faiths or particular religious practices,
and they cannot impose significant costs on persons not voluntarily
engaged in the exempted religious practice. But nothing in our constitutional tradition suggests that regulatory exemptions for religious
practice are facially invalid.
Fortunately, the Court agrees. Three times in recent years it has
unanimously rejected the claim that regulatory exemptions for religiously motivated conduct establish the unregulated religion." It
reached these decisions without inquiring into original understanding. This Article argues that such evidence as we have of original understanding supports the Court's decisions.
It is no part of my claim that original understanding should be
controlling. But original understanding is relevant on almost any view
of constitutional interpretation, and in the view of some Justices, it
should be decisive. So it is a matter of some importance to review the
original understanding that supports or contradicts the Court's
decisions.
I.

REGULATORY EXEMPTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT

A.

CLAUSE

The Attack on Regulatory Exemptions

Establishment Clause attacks on religious exemptions come in
many variations.1 2 But the core idea at the heart of all those argu10

See supra notes 6-7.

11

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-26 (2005); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512

U.S. 687, 705-06 (1994); id. at 711-12 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 715-16
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 722-27 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 743-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 334-39 (1987); id. at 340-46 (Brennan,J., concurring); id. at 346 (Blackmun,J.,
concurring); id. at 348-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see infra notes 254-67 and

accompanying text; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (reaffirming legislative power to
enact exemptions while holding that they are not constitutionally required); id. at

893-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that exemptions are constitutionally
required).
12 This argument is made most forcefully and explicitly in the losing briefs in the
cases cited supra note 11. See Brief for Respondents at 10-24, Cutter, 544 U.S. 709
(No. 03-9877); Brief for Respondents at 21-29, Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (Nos. 93-517, 93-
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ments is that government can establish a religion by failing to regulate
it, at least if the religion or one of its practitioners does some act that
is regulated in secular contexts. Exemptions from government regulation are said to give special preference to the unregulated religious
practice, and thus to establish the religion of which the practice is a
part.
The argument proceeds from the premise that the Establishment
Clause, or the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause together, require government neutrality toward religion, including neutrality between religion and nonreligion. That premise has been
controversial, but I share it; nothing in this Article depends on rejecting the premise of government neutrality toward religion.
The second step in the modern argument that exemptions violate
the Establishment Clause is to assume that neutrality means what I
have called "formal neutrality"-the absence of rules that formally distinguish on the basis of religion.' 3 A rule that children may consume
wine at communion services and Seder dinners, but not at secular
events-or any other rule permitting a thing to be done for religious
purposes but not for secular purposes-violates formal neutrality.
Regulatory exemptions are not formally neutral, but they are often
14
consistent with what I have called "substantive neutrality."
Formal neutrality seeks to create religiously neutral categories; substantive neutrality seeks to create religiously neutral incentives, minimizing the extent to which government either encourages or
527, 93-539); Brief for Appellees at 25-39, Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (Nos. 86-179, 86-401).
For academic versions of the argument, see PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAw 17-18, 40-41, 111-12 (1962) (arguing that the Religion Clauses prohibit any
government classification based on religion, either to impose a burden or confer a
benefit, including religious exemptions from regulation); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the

First Amendment, 52 U. PITt. L. REv. 75, 182-85 (1990) (arguing that regulatory exemptions for religion subordinate democratic control to a nondemocratic, extrahuman force); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: ParadoxRedux, 1992 SUP. CT. REv.
123, 123-24 (arguing that the Establishment Clause prohibits the exemptions that the
Free Exercise Clause seems to require, so that one of the Clauses must be interpreted
very narrowly and its values subordinated to the values of the other). For a more
nuanced view, see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 246-52 (2006) (arguing that exemptions are unconstitutional if they exceed the authors' principle of "equal liberty," which depends on
sophisticated comparisons of religious commitments to comparably important secular
commitments).
13 See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 999-1001 (1990).

14

Id. at 1001.
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discourages religious practice. 15 Criminalizing communion wine for
children is a powerful discouragement of a religious exercise; permitting children to take both the bread and wine at communion is unlikely to encourage nonbelievers to attend worship services, or to
encourage believers to shift from a denomination that uses grape
juice to a denomination that uses wine.
This choice between formal and substantive neutrality poses the
modern conceptual argument in a nutshell, but it is relevant here only
to the task of integrating original understanding with modern interpretation. My principal purpose here is to test the conclusion of the
formal neutrality argument-that religious exemptions violate the Establishment Clause-against the original understanding of the Establishment Clause.
There is no significant originalist support for the core idea that
exempting religion from regulation establishes religion. Exemptions
from regulation were no part of the establishment of religion known
to the founding generation. Exemptions emerged as an outgrowth of
the state-by-state process of expanding free exercise. Some of these
exemptions provoked substantial debate, and their opponents made
many arguments, but I have found no one in the eighteenth century
who attacked them as an establishment of religion or denied that legislatures had power to enact them.
B.

The Features of Establishment

The essence of establishment was government sponsorship and
control of a single church or, in later years, of a group of churches,
such as all Protestant denominations, or all Christian denominations.
In Judge McConnell's comprehensive survey of establishment in England and the colonies, he identifies six historic "Elements of the
16
Establishment:
1. Governmental Control Over the Doctrines, Structure, and Per17
sonnel of the State Church;
2. Mandatory Attendance at Religious Worship Services in the State
Church;

18

15 See id. at 1001-06; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 561-63 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (further comparing
formal and substantive neutrality).
16 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2131 (2003).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 2144.
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3. Public Financial Support [of the State Church];19
20
4. Prohibition of Religious Worship in Other Denominations;
5. Use of the State Church for Civil Functions; 2 1 and
6. Limitation of Political Participation to Members of the State

Church.

22

This careful listing of six distinct elements is organizationally
helpful, but each of these elements is familiar from other thorough
descriptions of the established churches. 23 Each of these historic elements of the establishment is prohibited by modern constitutional
law, sometimes with controversy about the limits of the principle and
its application to analogous cases:
1. Government controlled the doctrine, structure, and personnel
of the established church; today, government is not permitted to con24
trol the doctrine, structure, or personnel of religious organizations.
2. Government mandated attendance at worship services of the
established church; today, mandatory attendance at worship services is
unconstitutional, even when judicial deference is at its maximum, as
in judicial review of military regulations. 25 The contested modern
counterpart to mandatory worship is prayer and other religious observances at government-sponsored events that people attend for secu26
lar reasons.
19
20
21
22
23

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2146.
2159.
2169.
2176.
See, e.g., THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-77 (1986). Of course I do not mean to
imply that McConnell merely organizes earlier work. He also provides clear analysis,
massive supporting detail, and careful documentation.
24 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-06 (1979) (holding that civil courts
may resolve church property disputes on the basis of the church's own documents, or
by deferring to church tribunals, but not on the basis of judicial resolution of any
issue of religious doctrine or practice); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696, 708-25 (1976) (holding that civil courts cannot review church tribunal's
decisions to remove bishop and divide diocese); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 106-21 (1952) (holding that a statute awarding church property and
authority to dissident faction in preference to those recognized by original church
authorities violates the Free Exercise Clause).
25 See Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(invalidating compulsory chapel at military academies); id. at 284-96 (Bazelon, J.,
concurring); id. at 296-305 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
26 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-17 (2000) (holding that student-led invocation at high-school football games violates the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-99 (1992) (holding that clergy-led
invocation at middle-school graduation violates the Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist.
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3. The established church received tax support for its core religious functions; today, tax support for those functions is clearly unconstitutional, and the debated question is whether tax support of
religiously sponsored schools or social services is sufficiently analo27
gous to be an establishment.
4. Government suppressed religious competition with the established church; today, restrictions on minority faiths are rarely part of
any effort to establish some other religion, and such restrictions are
now treated as a free exercise issue. 28 This distinction has very early
roots. Both England and America reached relative consensus on free
exercise long before they reached anything like consensus on disestablishment. England enacted "toleration" for all Trinitarian Protestants in 1688, in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, 2 9 and John
Locke published his influential justification for toleration the following year.30 The core idea of "toleration" was that religious dissenters
would be free to worship in their own way while the established
church continued to function with little or no change for everyone
31
else.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-27 (1963) (holding that opening school day with
prayer and Bible reading violates the Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 424-36 (1962) (holding that reciting an official prayer in public schools violates
the Establishment Clause).
27 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-63 (2002) (upholding a
program of state vouchers that could be used to pay tuition at a wide range of public
and private schools, including religious schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
611-25 (1971) (holding that cash grants to supplement teacher salaries at religious
schools violate the Establishment Clause).
28 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531-47 (1993) (holding that a ban on animal sacrifice violates the Free Exercise
Clause); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 (1990) (holding that the
Free Exercise Clause requires no justification of government-imposed burdens on religious practice if those burdens are imposed by neutral and generally applicable law).
29 An Act for Exempting their Majestyes Protestant Subjects Dissenting from the
Church of England from the Penalties of Certaine Lawes, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 18
(Eng.) [hereinafter Toleration Act], reprinted in 6 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 74
(photo. reprint 1993) (1819).
30 SeeJohn Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT

AND

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION

125 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil

Blackwell 3d ed. 1966) (1690). The letter was first published in English in November
1689; a revised edition was published in 1690. SeeJ.W. Gough, Introduction to THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra, at
xlvi-xlvii.
31 So, for example, the English statute commonly known as the "Act of Toleration" was written in terms of the rights and duties of persons "dissenting from the
Church of England," as indicated in the formal title, in §§ 4, 5, and 6, and in similar
formulations in § 7 ("dissenting Protestants") and §10 ("Dissenters from the Church
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5. Government used the established church for civil functions;
today, government cannot delegate government functions to religious
organizations, 32 and the point of modern controversy is whether it can
contract for performance of specific services on equal terms with relig33
ious and secular organizations alike.
6. Government restricted political participation to members of
the established church; today, the state cannot restrict political partici34
pation on the basis of religious convictions or participation.
Even the modern controversy over government endorsement of
religious beliefs may readily be analogized to government designating
35
the church or group of churches to be established.
Exemptions from regulation do not appear on Judge McConnell's list or in any other description of the established church. The
established church had no need of regulatory exemptions, because
government rarely made laws that prevented members of the established church from practicing their religion. Laws regulating conduct
were generally consistent with the moral commitments of the established church, both because the established church and its members
had substantial political influence, and because government's control
of England"). See Toleration Act, supra note 29, at 74-75; see also People v. Philips
(N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. June 14, 1813), reprinted in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC
QUESTION IN AMERICA 111 (photo. reprint 1974) (1813), and excerpts reprinted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAw. 199, 207 (1955) ("In this country there
is no alliance between church and state; no established religion; no tolerated religion-for toleration results from establishment.").
32 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696-702 (1994) (plurality opinion) (holding that state cannot define a school district on religious lines); id. at
728-30 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing the fifth vote on the ground that state
cannot draw electoral boundaries on religious lines); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
459 U.S. 116, 120-27 (1982) (holding that state cannot delegate to churches any portion of its power to grant or withhold liquor licenses).
33 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-63 (2002) (holding that
state can pay for education of children in religious and secular schools alike); Bowen
v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-18 (1988) (holding that government can give grants to
both religious and secular non-profit organizations for programs to prevent adolescent pregnancy); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295-300 (1899) (holding that
government could contract with Providence Hospital, owned and operated by an order of nuns, for care of the indigent patients in the District of Columbia).
34 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 625-29 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(holding that state constitutional provision precluding ministers from serving in the
legislature violates Free Exercise Clause); id. at 629-42 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that provision violates both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses);
id. at 642-43 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that provision violates the First Amendment); id. at 643-46 (White, J., concurring) (stating that provision violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
35

See Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support, supra note 1, at 41-48.
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over the established church, generally including the power to appoint
clergy, tended to prevent the emergence of religious teachings that
challenged government policy.3 6 The King was the supreme head of
the Church of England,3 7 all Anglican clergy were appointed under
his authority,3 8 and fundamental religious teachings were specified by
statute, beginning with the wonderfully named act "abolishing diversity in Opynions. ' 13 9 In Massachusetts and the other New England establishments modeled on Massachusetts, clergy were elected by the
40
voters of each local jurisdiction.
Even a nonestablished church has no need for exemptions where
its members have political control. Thus in Pennsylvania, where there
was never an established church, there was no exemption from military service or oath taking so long as the Society of Friends-"the people commonly called Quakers" in the usage of the time-were
politically dominant. Instead, the laws did not require military service
or oath taking of anyone. 4 1 Exemptions were enacted only after
42
Quakers lost control-when the Crown imposed oath requirements
and when a new political majority enacted conscription to raise an
army for the Revolution. 4 3 Then the Quakers, as a faith unable to
36 See McConnell, supra note 16, at 2131-44 (reviewing the many ways in which
government controlled the established church).
37 See An Acte concernynge the Kynges Highnes to be supreme heed of the
Churche of Englande & to have auctoryte to refourme & redresse all errours heresyes
& abuses yn the same, 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.), reprintedin 3 THE STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 29, at 492.
38 See An Acte restraynyng the payment of Annates, &c, 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 20
(Eng.), reprinted in 3 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 29, at 462.
39 See An Acte abolishing diversity in Opynions, 1539, 31 Hen. 8, c. 14 (Eng.),
reprinted in 3 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 29, at 739.
40 See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. III, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRI-

Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1888, 1889-90 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter LAWS OF THE STATES].
41 The Law About the Manner of Giving Evidence and Against Such as Lie in
Conversation, ch. 99 (1700), reprintedin 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA
FROM 1682-1801, at 133 (James Mitchell and Henry Flanders comps., Clarence M.
Busch 1896) [hereinafter PA. STAT.]. The law was repealed by the Queen in Council
in 1706.
42 An Act Prescribing the Forms of Declaration of Fidelity, Abjuration and Affirmation, Instead of the Forms Heretofore Required in Such Cases, ch. 281 (1724),
reprinted in 3 PA. STAT., supra note 41, at 427. The long dispute over oaths in the early
eighteenth century is described inJ. WILLIAM FROST, A PERFECT FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA 23-25 (1990).
43 See, e.g., Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-BasedExemptions in Early America: The
Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10J.L. & RELIGION 367, 388-94 (1994)
(summarizing developments from a perspective hostile to exemptions).
TORIES, AND COLONIES
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control public policy even in Pennsylvania, needed exemptions. And
within the limits described in the next Part, these exemptions were
44
enacted.
II.

THE ORIGIN OF REGULATORY EXEMPTIONS

Regulatory exemptions emerged when the majority became willing to provide for the religious liberty of minority faiths. Exemptions
were never part of the establishment; they grew out of a political commitment to free exercise. The emergence of free exercise was an early
step in the long process of disestablishment, but as we shall see, regulatory exemptions could and did coexist with formally established
churches.
Disestablishment did not happen all at once; it emerged first in
certain colonies and later state-by-state in the early republic. The formal designation of an established and tax-supported church was abandoned over a period of about sixty years, beginning in the 1770s and
ending in 1833. 4 5 But this was just one stage in a longer process; the

multiple elements of the classic establishment were abandoned oneby-one over a period of centuries, and the gradual abandonment of
informal government support for popular religion continues, with debate and resistance, to this day.
As early as 1675, Connecticut exempted Quakers from attending
the established worship-provided they did not assemble for religious
purposes themselves; 46 after 1708, Connecticut permitted dissenters
to worship in their own way. 47 In 1688, the Act of Toleration permit44 See PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII ("Nor can any man who
is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will
pay such equivalent. . ."), reprinted in 5 LAws OF THE STATES, supra note 40, at 3081,
3083. This and other Pennsylvania provisions, and the qualification of an
"equivalent," are discussed infra in notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
45

See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-StateSettlement in the

Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1385, 1432-48, 1457-1540 (reviewing disestablishment state-by-state). The beginning date would be much earlier if one includes
the states that never had a tax-supported church.
46 Act ofJuly 9, 1675, reprinted in 2 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 260, 264 (Hartford, F.A. Brown 1852). For descriptions of this and other
early steps toward tolerance, see CURRY, supra note 23, at 25.
47 See An Act for Securing the Rights of Conscience in Matters of Religion, to
Christians of Every Denomination in This State, reprinted in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 21 (Hartford, Elisha Babcock 1786) [hereinafter
CONNECTICUT LAWS]. The cited source is an alphabetical collection of Connecticut
statutes in effect in 1786, but it does not give dates of enactment. The Baptist leader
John Leland gives the date of the original version of this statute as 1708. See Extracts
from Connecticut Ecclesiastical Laws,

inJOHN LELAND, THE CONNECTICUT DISSENTER'S
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ted dissenting Trinitarian Protestants to worship in England. 48 This
reform spread slowly and unevenly through the colonies, although resistance persisted in Virginia up to the eve of the Revolution. 49 In
1753, the King's Attorney General issued an opinion that the Act of
Toleration applied throughout the colonies. 50
Once a state decided that minority faiths should be permitted to
freely worship, the logic of toleration suggested that they should also
be exempted from other laws that made their lives unnecessarily difficult. The impulse that led to toleration was that religious dissenters
should be free to live in a jurisdiction and that their lives should not
be made miserable because of their faith. Once a jurisdiction came
around to this view, it quickly became apparent that toleration must
apply not just to belief, but also to religious speech and worship, and
to important religious conduct. Dissenters could not live in a state
where their worship was penalized, but neither could they live in a
state where any of their other important religious practices were penalized. Some legislators may have viewed these regulatory exemptions for religious conduct as a right and others as a matter of
legislative grace, but either way, regulatory exemptions quickly
emerged in the wake of toleration for dissenting worship.
The first exemption from oath taking appeared in 1669 in the
Carolina colony, 5 1 which from its charter in 1663 recruited settlers by
advertising "full and free Liberty of Conscience. '52 As toleration
spread through the eighteenth century, the exemption from oath takBox: No. 1, at 26, 28 (New London, Charles Holt 1802), availableat Infotrac,
Gale Doc. No. F3704953471.
48 Toleration Act, supra note 29, at 74.
49 See Esbeck, supra note 45, at 1475-76, 1485-87, 1537; McConnell, supra note
16, at 2161-69.
50 See SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 105-06
STRONG

(1902).
51 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina § 100 (1669), reprinted in 5 LAWS OF
THE STATES, supra note 40, at 2772, 2784. Subsection III says that "every church or
profession shall, in their terms of communion, set down the external way whereby
they witness a truth as in the presence of God ...." Id. § 100(111), at 2784. Thomas
Curry reports that Quakers "enter[ed] pledges in a book in lieu of swearing." CuRRY,"
supra note 23, at 56. By the Revolution, North Carolina had adopted the common
solution of allowing Quakers to affirm instead of swear. See An Act Concerning
Oaths, ch. 108, § 4 (1777) (codifying "the manner heretofore used and accustomed"),
reprinted in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 269, 270 (Raleigh, Joseph Gales

1821); An Act for Establishing Courts of Law, and for Regulating the Proceedings
Therein, ch. 115, § 42 (1777) (making clear that the exemption extended to criminal
as well as civil trials), reprinted in 1 LAws OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra, at
281, 300.
52 CuRRY, supra note 23, at 56.
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ing became nearly universal. 53 Even Connecticut and Massachusetts,
the colonies that had persecuted Quakers most vigorously, 54 enacted
exemptions from oath taking in the eighteenth century. 5 5 The right
to affirm instead of swear appears four times, matter-of-factly and without controversy, in the Constitution of the United States, in provisions
ratified both before and simultaneously with the Establishment
Clause. 5 6 However familiar and uncontroversial it has become, the
exemption from the obligation to take oaths is in fact a religious exemption from a generally applicable law. Those who proposed and
ratified the Establishment Clause do not appear to have thought that
this exemption was an establishment of religion.
North Carolina and Maryland enacted exemptions from the requirement of removing hats in court. 57 This was a response to a famous incident, much denounced in America, in which an English
53

See Arlin M. Adams & CharlesJ. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.

L. REV. 1559, 1630-32 (1989) (collecting provisions from state and federal
constitutions).
54 See CURRY, supra note 23, at 21-22. Massachusetts hanged four Quakers between 1658 and 1661, when the Crown intervened to stop the practice. See id. at 22;
Act of May 28, 1661 (providing for multiple whippings and banishment of Quakers,
and execution of those who returned repeatedly), reprinted in 4 RECORDS OF THE GovERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND pt. 2, at 18, 19-20
(Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1854) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETrS
BAY RECORDS]; Act of Nov. 27, 1661 (suspending these penalties in deference to a
letter from the King), reprinted in 4 MASSACHUSETrS BAY RECORDS, supra, at 34, 34; Act
of Oct. 8, 1662 (reinstating a smaller number of whippings, and banishment), reprinted in 4 MASSACHUSETTS BAY RECORDS, supra, at 58, 59.
55 For Connecticut, see An Act for Prescribing and Establishing Forms of Oaths
in This State, reprinted in CONNECTICUT LAws, supra note 47, at 182, 187; An Act Relative to the People Commonly Called Quakers, reprinted in CONNECTICUT LAWS, supra
note 47, at 196, 197. For Massachusetts, see An Act Providing that the Solemn Affirmation of the People Called Quakers Shall, in Certain Cases, Be Accepted Instead of
an Oath in the Usual Form; and for Preventing Inconveniences by Means of Their
Having Heretofore Acted in Some Town Offices Without Taking the Oaths by Law
Required for Such Offices, ch. 20 (1744), reprinted in 3 ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETIS BAY 126 (Boston, Albert J.
Wright 1878) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS ACTS AND REsOLVES]. For discussion, see
CURRY, supra note 23, at 89-90.
56 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (oath of Senators when sitting as court of impeachment); id. art. I, § 1, cl. 8 (presidential oath); id. art. VI, cl. 3 (oath of state and
federal legislators and executive and judicial officers to support the Constitution); id.
amend. IV (oath on application for search warrant).
57 See Act of Apr. 19, 1784, ch. 29, § II, 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 363, 363 ("[I]t shall
be lawful for the people called Quakers to wear their hats as well within the several
courts of judicature in this state as elsewhere, unless otherwise ordered by the
court."), microformed on North Carolina General Assembly Acts (William S. Hein &
Co.). The Maryland law, which may have been some sort of executive order, is dePA.
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judge had a hat placed upon the head of William Penn, and then held
Penn in contempt for refusing to remove it.58 Rhode Island exempted Jews from incest laws with respect to marriages "within the
degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion." 59
Another common set of exemptions, more closely connected to
the process of disestablishment, was exemption from paying taxes to
support the established church. Beginning in the eighteenth century,
exemptions from church taxes spread through the colonies that collected such taxes, although implementation was sometimes grudging. 60 The famous general assessment proposal in Virginia, in 1785,
was a last attempt to preserve financial support for churches by including all Christian denominations in the benefits and by universalizing
the exemption-any taxpayer could support either the church of his
choice or a fund for schools. 61 But on this issue, exemptions and multiple establishments were only a stopgap. Virginia's general assessment bill was defeated. By 1833, the last state system of tax support
for churches was repealed in Massachusetts, 62 and exemptions from
the church tax were no longer an issue.
The first exemption for conscientious objectors to military con63 It
scription was enacted in 1673, in famously tolerant Rhode Island.
scribed in ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 1634-1980, at
29-30 (1988).
58 For elaboration of this incident, see McConnell, supra note 6, at 1471-72.
59 An Act Regulating Marriage and Divorce § 7 (1798), reprinted in 2 THE FIRST
LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 481, 483 (John D. Cushing ed., 1983).
60 See, e.g., An Act To Exempt Persons Commonly Called Anabaptists, and Those
Called Quakers, Within This Province, from Being Taxed for and Towards the Support of Ministers (1728), reprinted in 2 MASSACHUSETrS ACTS AND RESOLVES, supra note
55, at 494-96 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1874); MAsS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. III,
("And all moneys paid by the subject to the support of public worship, and of the
public teachers aforesaid, shall, if he require it, be uniformly applied to the support of
the public teacher or teachers of his own religious sect or denomination, provided

there be any on whose instructions he attends.") reprinted in 3 LAWS

OF THE STATES,

supra note 40, at 1888, 1890. For additional examples and discussion, see CURRY,

supra note 23, at 89-90; Esbeck, supra note 45, at 1434-36, 1440-47, 1476-77, 1479,
1489-91, 1498, 1508 n.431, 1512; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1469.
61 The Virginia bill is reprinted as a supplementary appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947)
(Rutledge,J., dissenting). For analysis, see THOMAS E. BUCKLE, CHURCH AND STATE IN
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 108-09 (1977).
62 See MASS. CONST. amend, art. XI (repealing "the third article of the bill of
rights").
63 See R. R. Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United
States, 20 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 409, 412-13 (1952). An earlier Massachusetts law exempted any person who would pay twelve pence. Act of Oct. 19, 1664, reprinted in 4
MASSACHUSETrS BAY RECORDS, supra note 54, at 135. But there is no reason to assume
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provided that no person or persons conscientiously opposed to military service
shall at any time be compelled against his or their judgment and
conscience to trayne, arm or fight, to kill any person nor persons by
reason of, or at the command of any officer of this Collony, civill
nor military, nor by reasons of any by-law here past or formerly enacted; nor shall suffer any punishment, fine, distraint, pennalty nor
imprisonment, who cannot in conscience traine, fight, nor kill any
person nor persons .... 64
The Act further provided that conscientious objectors should perform
what would be called, in twentieth-century discussions of conscription, 65 alternative service:
Provided, nevertheless ... that when any enemy shall approach or
assault the Collony or any place thereof, that then it shall be lawfull
for the civill officers for the time beinge, as civill officers (and not as
martiall or military) to require such said persons as are of sufficient
able bodye and of strength (though exempt from arminge and
fightinge), to conduct or convey out of the danger of the enemy,
weake and aged impotent persons, women and children, goods and
cattle, by which the common weale may be better maintained, and
works of mercy manifested to distressed, weake persons; and shall
be required to watch to informe of danger (but without armes in
martiall manner and matters), and to performe any other civill service by order of the civill officers for the good of the Collony, and
66
inhabitants thereof.

this was for the benefit of conscientious objectors; Massachusetts had reenacted its
laws for whipping and banishing Quakers only two years before. See supra note 54.
Massachusetts finally exempted Quakers from military service in 1757. An Act To
Exempt the People Called Quakers from the Penalty of the Law for Non-attendance
on Military Matters, ch. 17 (1757) [hereinafter Massachusetts Act], reprinted in 4 MASSACHUSErrS Acrs AND RESOLVES, supra note 55, at 49 (Rand, Avery & Co. 1881).
64 Act of Aug. 13, 1673, reprinted in 2 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND 488, 498 (John Russell Bartlett ed.,
Providence, Crawford Green & Bro. 1857) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND REcoRDs].
65 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (2000) (requiring conscientious objectors to per-

form "noncombatant service," or, if they conscientiously object to that as well, "such
civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or inter-

est as the Director may deem appropriate"). For repeated use of the phrases "alternative service" and "alternative civilian service" to describe this requirement, see

Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 363 n.1, 364, 365 n.6, 367, 374, 376, 378-79,
382-83, 385 n.19 (1974); id. at 388-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66 Act of Aug. 13, 1673, reprinted in RHODE ISLAND RECoRDS, supra note 64, at
498-99.
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Exemption from military service was of course the most controversial claim to exemption. 6 7 This exemption is necessary to relieve
an egregious burden on one of the most deeply held obligations of
conscience, but it also confers a large secular benefit, relieving those
exempted from essential duties that can be dangerous, unpleasant,
and difficult. The secular benefit creates resentment; where the number of conscientious objectors is large, as in colonial Pennsylvania, exemption concentrates the burdens of military service on others to an
extent that is significant and not just theoretical. The effect on secular benefits and burdens distorts religious incentives; it can tempt people to falsely claim the exemption, or to honestly adopt the religious
belief that makes them eligible for the exemption. In cases such as
this, where religious exemption confers a substantial secular benefit, it
68
is difficult to choose the more nearly neutral course.
Most colonies, and later most states, responded to this difficulty
with a compromise something like that illustrated in Rhode Island:
Quakers and similar conscientious objectors were exempt from military service in person, but were required to provide a substitute, pay a
69
commutation fee, or less commonly, perform alternative service.
This is a real and important exemption, even though less than what
the Quakers and other pacifist faiths wanted. The debates over these
exemptions are a principal topic of the next Part.
III.

THE FOUNDING-ERA DEBATES

A.

Legislative Debates

Legislatively enacted exemptions for religious practice were thus
common by the time of the First Amendment. There is of course a
large originalist debate about whether this practice of exemptions was
embedded in the Free Exercise Clause. 70 But there is no plausible
originalist debate about whether such exemptions violated the federal
Establishment Clause or any state establishment clause. The founding
67 See generally West, supra note 43 (reviewing the debate over military service exemptions from a perspective hostile to exemptions).
68 See Laycock, supra note 13, at 1016-18.
69 See, e.g., N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. I, § XIII ("No person who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be compelled thereto,
provided he will pay an equivalent."), reprinted in 4 LAWS OF THE STATES, supranote 40,
at 2453, 2455; PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 LAWS
OF THE STATES, supra note 40, at 3081, 3083; Massachusetts Act, supra note 63, at 49.
For additional examples and discussion, see Adams & Emmerich, supra note 53, at
1632-33; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1468-69; Russell, supra note 63, at 414; West,
supra note 43, at 389.
70 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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generation was familiar with legislatively enacted exemptions for religious practice, and the states were busily engaged in disestablishing
churches, but there is hardly a trace of anyone arguing that legislatively enacted exemptions were an establishment.
The principal subject of relevant debate was exemption from military service. Opponents argued that unconditional exemptions from
military service were bad policy, but not that exemptions were unconstitutional or that they implicated any concern about establishment of
religion. In the First Congress, the Select Committee proposed to include, in what became our Second Amendment, a clause providing
that "no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear
arms." 7 1 Debating this proposal in the Committee of the Whole, Elbridge Gerry feared that government would "declare who are those
religiously scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms. ''72 In

this way, government might "destroy the militia, in order to raise an
army upon their ruins. ' 73 This objection seems so implausible-

among other things, it would require that "compelled" be interpreted
as "permitted"-as to suggest a willingness to argue just about anything in support of a reflexive opposition. But he did not argue that
the proposed exemption would establish religion; that argument was
apparently too implausible and unfamiliar to occur to him. The argument would not have been unfamiliar if he had heard anyone else
make it. This at least suggests that no such argument was circulating
in the First Congress, or in New York City (where the First Congress
met), or back home in Massachusetts.
Other opponents made a variety of more plausible arguments.
Mr. Jackson thought the amendment to exempt conscientious objectors "unjust," unless those exempted were required to pay an
equivalent.74 Mr. Smith thought those exempted should find a substitute. 7 5 Mr. Benson moved to strike the whole clause and leave the
issue to the legislature. 76 "I have no reason to believe but the Legislature will always possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left to
their discretion." 77 His motion was defeated, 24-22.78
71

1 ANNALS

72

Id.

73

Id. at 750.

74

Id.

75
76

Id.
Id. at 751.

77

Id.

78

Id.

OF CONG.

749 (Aug. 17, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).

18lo

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 81:5

Three days later, on the floor of the House, Mr. Scott also argued
that this exemption should be left to the legislature. "I conceive it,
said he, to be a legislative right altogether. There are many sects I
know, who are religiously scrupulous in this respect; I do not mean to
deprive them of any indulgence the law affords. '' 79 The proposal was
amended to read that "no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms in person," and as amended, passed by the requi8
site two-thirds vote.8 0 The clause was later removed in the Senate, '
where debate was not recorded.
This debate reveals opponents who wanted a more limited exemption, requiring payment of a fee or provision of a substitute.
These opponents prevailed in the House, by the addition of the words
"in person." The debate reveals other opponents who wanted the
whole issue left to legislatures, and these opponents appear to have
prevailed in the Senate. But the recorded debate contains no suggestion that legislative exemptions were in any way constitutionally suspect. There is no hint in this debate of any issue concerning
establishment of religion.
Debate was far more prolonged in Pennsylvania, where Quakers
and other peace churches were a substantial minority.8 2 And that debate is unusually well preserved, because local political practice put so
much in writing-in long petitions to the legislative Assembly and in
the exchange of formal messages, elaborating each side's arguments,
between the governor and the Assembly.
Quakers and their political allies, including nonpacifists who supported what came to be known as the Quaker party, controlled the
Pennsylvania Assembly well into the second half of the eighteenth
century.8 3 Quaker refusal to create a militia was a recurring issue, be79 Id. at 767 (Aug. 20, 1789).
80 Id. (emphasis added). The only other recorded statements are those of Mr.
Sherman, id. at 750, Mr.Vining, id. at 751, and Mr. Boudinot, id. at 767, all supporting the exemption as proposed, and Mr. Stone, who thought the text should clarify
"what the words 'religiously scrupulous' had reference to," id. at 751.
81 See I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRsT FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 136, 154 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972) (showing proposed
fifth Article of Amendment as received from House, with exemption from bearing

arms (Aug. 25, 1789), and as passed by Senate, amended to omit exemption from
bearing arms (Sept. 4, 1789)).
82 See RICHARD K. MACMASTER ET AL., CONSCIENCE IN CRISIS 50-55 (1979). Analyzing the available data sets, none of which is complete, MacMaster concludes that
members of the peace churches were something under a quarter of Pennsylvania's
population in the decade before the Revolution, id. at 52, and a somewhat larger
percentage of voters, id. at 52-54.
83 See FROST, supra note 42, at 64.
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cause of Indian raids on the frontier and also because of the risk of
invasion during Britain's intermittent wars with other European powers. The issue periodically became acute, most notably in 1739, when
the Crown wanted colonial troops for the War of Jenkins' Ear;84 in
1747, toward the end of King George's War;8 5 in 1755, at the outbreak

of the French and Indian War; 86 and in 1775, at the outbreak of the
Revolution. 87 Quakers demanded an unconditional exemption from
military service, and some Quakers refused to pay taxes too closely
linked to the war effort. 88 The nonpacifists, long a majority of the
population and a strong majority in the revolutionary Assembly, were
willing to offer exemption only from military service, and only on condition that those exempted do something else instead-usually pay
additional sums of cash to support the war effort. These disputes over
the militia and conscription provoked a long political battle, which
the Quakers finally lost in 1775 and later.
In the years before 1755, and to a declining extent thereafter, the
Quaker party controlled the Assembly and refused to create any form
of organized militia. Nonpacifists attacked this policy on many
grounds, including one that might be understood as an argument
about establishment of religion: "No governor objected to the conscientious scruples of Friends, but all insisted that Friends did not have
84 This was a colonial war between England and Spain, fought over trade and
influence in the Caribbean; the precipitating excuse was the action of Spanish privateers who seized the ship of an English smuggler, Captain RobertJenkins, and cut
off one of his ears as a warning to others. See REED BROWNING, THE WAR OF THE
AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION 23-24 (1993); MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 61-62.
85 This was the American name for the colonies' part in a much larger war that
historians eventually named the War of the Austrian Succession. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 63 (2002) (equating the two names); BROWNING, supra note
84, at xii (noting that the modern name dates from the nineteenth century). Arising
out of long-lasting strategic conflicts among the great European powers, id. at 26-33,
the war lasted nearly eight years and is estimated to have killed half a million people,
id. at 365, 375-77.

86

See, e.g.,

WILLIAM

M.

FOWLER, JR., EMPIRES AT WAR: THE FRENCH AND

WAR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR NORTH AMERICA,

INDIAN

1754-1763 (2005). Fought in North

America for imperial control of the eastern half the continent, this war was also part
of a larger European conflict, known in Europe as the Seven Years War. Id. at 1.
87 See, e.g., ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE (1982). For discussion of
the disputes between pacifist and nonpacifist Pennsylvanians associated with these
wars, see FROST, supra note 42, at 29-32, 36-38, 41, 62; MACMASTER ET AL., supra note
82, at 31-32, 61-83, 165-68, 213-23, 278-300; Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in
Philadelphia,54 EMORY L.J. 1603 (2005); West, supra note 43, at 385-87, 389-90.
88 See FROST, supra note 42, at 39; MACMASER ET AL., supra note 82, at 29-30,
33-34, 78-81, 221, 354-64. Illustrative petitions for exemption from war taxes are
reprinted in MAcMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 113-15.
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the right to impose their practices and beliefs upon others." 89 On
first encountering this argument in the secondary literature, I thought
it analogous to modern arguments that laws corresponding to religious teachings violate the Establishment Clause. After finally tracking
this argument down in original sources, I think that this is mostly not
what the Quaker's critics were saying. Most of the time, their argument sounded much more in policy than in religion. Defense was a
necessity, so Quaker peace principles were bad policy, and the whole
colony was stuck with this bad policy because of the religious scruples
of those in political power. 90 But at least one pamphleteer, expounding on this political theme, did implicitly accuse the Quakers of
acting like an established church:
[Y]ou see that our Assembly are, and have always been Quakers, and
that they are still principledagainst bearing Arms. What can be more
absurd than such a Declaration from those who are in the room of
our Protectors? That which is the chief Design of Government, they
declare they can have nothing to do with! . . . [The Quakers say
that ] we will not provide for [the Province's] Safety, as other Provinces have done for theirs, by compulsive Methods, nor depart one
Jot from our Principles, if it were to save it from Destruction.
Neither will we give up the Government to others who would take
Care of its Defence; for the Laws are all ours, the Country is ours,
and tho' it be true that great Numbers of People, of other religious
Denominations, are come among us, yet they came by our
Toleration.

And now what more need be said to shew how unjustly this
Province is swayed by a Faction, and sacrificed to their separate Interests. Our very Laws themselves breathe the Spirit, and speak the
Language, of a Faction, who tell us that we are all tolerated only by
89 FROST, supra note 42, at 30; see also id. at 36; West, supra note 43, at 386-87.
90 See Message to the Assembly from Governor George Thomas (Jan. 10, 1740),
in 3 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES (8TH SERIES) 2535, 2535 (Gertrude MacKinney ed., 1931)
[hereinafter ARCHIVES] ("I must lament the unhappy Circumstances of a Country,
populous indeed, extensive in its Trade, blessed with many natural Advantages, and
capable of defending itself; but from a religious Principle of its Representatives
against bearing of Arms, subject to become the Prey of the first Invader"); Message
from Governor George Thomas (Jan. 23, 1740), in 3 ARCHIVES, supra, at 2547, 2551
("The Demeanor of the People called Quakers, may have merited the Protection of
the Crown, and the Esteem of Mankind; and I believe this is the first Instance, of a
Number of them made use of Liberty of Conscience for tying up the Hands of his
Majesty's Subjects, from defending a valuable Part of his Dominions"). I do not mean

to imply that Professor Frost misread the sources. Rather, I misread Professor Frost;
because he and I were focused on somewhat different questions, I read more into his
paraphrase than he had intended. Professor West closely tracks Professor Frost on
this point, and I probably misread him as well.
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their Grace and Favour. And yet these high and mighty Lords, who
speak so loudly of toleratingothers, can plead no Establishment in
their own Behalf. 9 1
Even this passage seems more concerned with faction than with
establishment. But assuming it is not anachronistic to read this passage as including an argument about establishment, it is an argument
that the modern courts have uniformly rejected. 9 2 There is an illdefined point at which the state would be unconstitutionally compelling religious worship or observance of religious ritual, 93 but short of
that, the Court's view has been that the state is simply regulating behavior within its power to regulate and that it is irrelevant if such regulation corresponds with the moral views of one or more religions. So
any Establishment Clause implications of this anti-Quaker argument
went well beyond modern Establishment Clause doctrine.
But more fundamentally, even if this is an Establishment Clause
argument, it is not an Establishment Clause argument about exemptions. The refusal to create a militia was in no sense a policy of exemption; it was an enactment of Quaker policy for everyone, and this
imposition of the views of one faith was precisely the point of the
establishment-sounding attack on the colony's policy.
The argument against the Quakers' refusal to create a militia is
more akin to an argument for exemptions-adherents of faiths that
were willing to fight should be exempt from the general policy of pacifism. But this would not be a standard-form argument for exemption.
It seems unlikely that many Anglicans or Presbyterians felt religiously
compelled to fight, although people may have talked themselves into
this position. The preamble to the 1755 militia law, drafted by Benjamin Franklin, 9 4 recites that "some" members of nonpacifist denominations "think it their Duty to fight in defense of their Country, their
Wives, their Families and Estates, and such have an Equal Right to
91

WILLIAM SMITH,

A

BRIEF VIEW OF THE CONDUCT OF PENNSYLVANIA, FOR THE YEAR

1755, at 75 (London, R. Griffiths 1756), available at Infotrac, Gale Doc. No.
CW3302956857. Smith was a politically active Anglican priest. See FROST, supra note
42, at 49-50.
92 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (holding that refusal to fund
abortions is not an establishment); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444 (1961)
(holding that Sunday closing laws are not an establishment); Clayton v. Place, 884
F.2d 376, 379-81 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that school's refusal to sponsor or permit
dances is not an establishment).
93 The line between regulating behavior and mandating religious observance is
briefly discussed in Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 793, 812-13 (1996).

94

See

FROST,

supra note 42, at 39.
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Liberty of Conscience with others." 95 In any event, no law prevented
individuals from fighting back when attacked, or even from organizing themselves into voluntary militias; 9 6 what was wanted was an organized defense, which required affirmative government conduct and
not merely an exemption from regulation. 9 7 So the analogy is quite
imperfect. But to the extent the argument was that the politically
dominant Quakers should not force religious minorities to conform
to a Quaker policy of pacifism, that is closely akin to arguing that religious minorities should have been exempt from the existing law.
At the outbreak of the French and Indian War, Quakers still held
a majority in the Assembly, 98 but the refusal to provide a militia became politically untenable. 99 And Quakers were unwilling to conscript others while exempting themselves; the Franklin-drafted
preamble recited that such a law would be "inconsistent and partial," 10 0 and many Quaker legislators appear to have believed that voting to conscript anyone would violate their conscience. 10 ' The
95 An Act for the Better Ordering and Regulating Such as Are Willing and Desirous To Be United for Military Purposes Within This Province, ch. 405 (1755) [hereinafter 1755 Act], reprinted in 5 PA. STAT., supra note 41, at 197 (William Stanley Ray
1898). The Act is partially reprinted in MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 115-17.
96 See FROST, supra note 42, at 31, 34-35 (summarizing the Quaker arguments).
97 See Message to the Assembly from Governor George Thomas (Jan. 10, 1740), in
3 ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at 2535, 2537 ("An Officer without legal Authority, and
Men under no legal Obligations, may indeed exhibit a pretty piece of Pagentry for a
little Time, but can be of no real Service in the Defence of a Country."); Message to
the Assembly from Governor George Thomas (Jan. 23, 1740), in 3 ARCHIVES, supra
note 90, at 2547, 2551 ("[N]o more than two or three Hundred Men appeared under
Arms in the Time of a former Governor, and . . .even that Number may not be
persuaded to do it now as they see no Probability of being serviciable to their Country,
for want of being put under proper Regulations by Law."); Message to the Assembly
from Governor Robert Hunter Morris (Nov. 3, 1755), in 5 ARCHIVES, supranote 90, at
4094, 4095 ("The People in the Back Counties have on this important Occasion behaved themselves with uncommon Spirit and Activity; but complain much of the Want
of Order and Discipline, as well as of Arms and Ammunition."); A Representation to
the General Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania, by Several of the Principal
Inhabitants of the City of Philadelphia, in Said Province (Nov. 11, 1755), in 5
ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at 4115, 4116 (" [I]t would neither be adviseable for the Sake
of such Men themselves, nor yet for the Sake of Public Liberty, to keep up an armed
Force in the Country, without the Sanction and Authority of Law."); id. at 4117
("[N]o Sums of Money, however great, will answer the Purpose of Defence, without
such a Law as we desire."). Each quotation is taken from a longer passage elaborating
the theme.
98 See FROST, supra note 42, at 39.
99 See West, supra note 43, at 386-87.
100 1755 Act, supra note 95, at 197.
101 See FROST, supra note 42, at 38-39; SMITH, supra note 91, at 76.
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Quakers' remarkable proposed solution was a private and voluntary
militia. The Act provided that it would henceforth be lawful "for the
freemen of this province to form themselves into companies, as heretofore they have used in time of war without law,

1 0°

2

and went on to

provide for the governance and regulation of this militia, authorizing
election of officers, articles of war, and courts martial,1 0 3 and exempting all "who are conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms," and "any
other persons of what persuasion or denomination soever who have
10 4
not first voluntarily signed the said articles after due consideration."
This voluntary militia comes considerably closer to a broadly applicable legislative exemption from the official pacifist policy.
This compromise satisfied neither the pacifists nor their opponents. 10 5 In 1756, after the delays incident to trans-Atlantic communication, the Crown "repealed" (that is, vetoed) the Act as ineffectual. 10 6
The Quaker Yearly Meeting condemned Quaker legislators for sacrificing conscience to retain power, urging them to resign. 10 7 After
1756, there was never again a Quaker majority in the Assembly. 10 8 But
the Quaker party, now consisting of "political Quakers" who disregarded the Meeting's advice to withdraw, other pacifists, and their
nonpacifist allies, continued to control the Assembly until the Revolution, 10 9 making ever greater efforts to satisfy the political pressure for
an effective military defense. 110
The Assembly tried again in 1757. This time it enacted conscription, with an exemption for conscientious objectors, provided that objectors either pay a fine of twenty shillings or perform such alternative
102 1755 Act, supra note 95, at 198.
103 Id. §§ 1-2, at 198-200.
104 Id. § 2, at 200.
105 See FROST, supra note 42, at 39.
106 The fact of the veto appears in a note to 1755 Act, supra note 95, at 201. For
the veto message, see 6 ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at 4394-95 (Charles F. Hoban ed.,
1935).
107 See FROST, supra note 42, at 39.
108 Id.
109 See id. at 32, 39, 60.
110 Id. at 62 ("The Quaker party survived until 1776 only by repudiating the goals
of the Society of Friends."). Another commentator has suggested a more complicated
story-that the Quakers who left politics expanded the reach of the peace teaching
while the political Quakers emphasized other Quaker teachings. Quaker teaching on
pacifism conflicted with Quaker teaching on the government's duty to defend the
people, and this conflict became most apparent where Quakers controlled the government. For an account of the Quakers' evolving efforts to resolve this conflict, and
the deep split that emerged by the middle of the eighteenth century, see Hermann
Wellenreuther, The PoliticalDilemma of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, 1681-1748, 94 PA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY

135 (1970).
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service as extinguishing fires, suppressing slave insurrections, caring
for the wounded, conveying messages, and taking women, children,
the infirm, or threatened property to places of safety.'1 1 This time the
governor vetoed the bill as ineffectual, and the provision for alternative service did not reappear in any subsequent legislation. 112
Meanwhile, militia supporters worked to make something useful
out of a voluntary and legally unauthorized militia. In 1747, with
French privateers raiding on the lower Delaware and reports of a
French invasion planned for the following summer, 113 Benjamin
Franklin had successfully urged the creation of an "Association" of
persons willing to defend the colony. 114 He organized a lottery to
raise funds for fortifications, and solicited artillery from other colonies. 1'5 The resulting Association was disbanded when King George's
War ended in 1748.116

In the French and Indian War, there were again volunteer units
modeled on the Association, and the governor commissioned officers
for these troops, relying on authority granted to William Penn in the
colony's original charter. 1 17 The governor emphasized the limited
scope of this authority, warning the Assembly: "I have neither Money,
Arms or Ammunition at my Disposal; all I have therefore been able to
do has been to issue Commissions to such as were willing to take
them, and to encourage the People to defend themselves and their
Families till the Government was enabled to protect them."'1 8 The

111 An Act for Forming and Regulating the Militia Within this Province (1757),
reprinted in MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 117, 119. This legislation does not
appear in the Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, presumably because the governor never
signed the bill.
112 See MACMASTER FT AL., supra note 82, at 117.
113 See MORGAN, supra note 85, at 65.
114 See Plain Truth: Or, Serious Considerationson the Present State of the City of Philadelphia, and Province of Pennsylvania 19-22 (1747), available at Infotrac, Gale Doc. No.
CW3304472384. For discussion, see EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 52-54
(2006); MACMASTER ET AL., supranote 82, at 68-71; MORGAN, supra note 85, at 65-70.
115 See GAUSTAD, supra note 114, at 53-54; MORGAN, supra note 85, at 67-68.
116 See MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 71.
117 See FROST, supra note 42, at 40 (describing the volunteers); An Act for Regulating the Officers and Soldiers Commisionated and Raised by the Governor for the
Defense of This Province, ch. 409 (1756) [hereinafter 1756 Act], reprinted in 5 PA.
STAT. (William Stanley Ray 1898), supra note 41, at 219. The governor's action and
the source of his authority are recited in the preamble. Id. at 219-20.
118 Message to the Assembly from Governor Robert Hunter Morris (Nov. 3, 1755),
in 5 ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at 4095.
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Assembly now acted to provide regulations and funds for these
troops, 119 but it did not enact any further militia legislation.
When the Revolution came, the issue was squarely posed. National existence was at stake; Quakers were a highly visible and affluent minority, suspected of Toryism; 120 in their resistance to war, some
of them made statements supporting the Crown. 121 The British
threatened Philadelphia by late 1776, and captured the city in 1777.122
Many pacifists were disfranchised for refusing to pay taxes or affirm
loyalty to the revolutionary government, effectively excluding Quakers
from the Assembly.123 There was hostility to pacifists and episodes of
harsh treatment. 2 4 Political conditions could not have been worse
for a claim of exemption from military service. Yet the basic exemption survived.
Pennsylvania's initial response was to support the Association,
turning it into a de facto state-sponsored militia. On the question of
who should serve, the state adopted an exemption from service in the
Association on condition of paying a monetary "equivalent." 125 The
Assembly initially resolved that all white males between the ages of
sixteen and fifty, "not scrupulous of bearing arms," should be urged
"to join the said Association immediately," and that those "who shall
not associate for the Defence of this Province, ought to contribute an
equivalent to the Time spent by the Associators in acquiring the military Discipline." I 26 Not quite three weeks later, the Assembly enacted
"Rules and Regulations for the Better Government of the Military As119 See, e.g., 1756 Act, supranote 117, at 219; An Act for Striking the Sum of Thirty
Thousand Pounds in Bills of Credit and Giving the Same to the King's Use, and for
Providing a Fund To Sink the Bills so To Be Emitted by Laying an Excise upon Wine,
Rum, Brandy and Other Spirits, ch. 411 (1756), reprintedin 5 PA. STAT. (William Stanley Ray 1898), supra note 41, at 243.
120 See FROST, supranote 42, at 63, 66-67; Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1609. The
pacifist Mennonites were also seen as affluent. See MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82,
at 46-47.
121 See Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1623-24.
122 For the threat to Philadelphia in December 1776, see DAVID MCCULLOUcH,
1776, at 263-64 (2005). For the capture and occupation of the city from September
1777 to May 1778, see MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 87, at 355, 389-91, 420, 541-44.
123 See FROST, supra note 42, at 67-69.
124 See MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 281, 290, 293, 397-407; West, supra
note 43, at 393.
125 See FROST, supra note 42, at 62-63; West, supra note 43, at 390-91.
126 Resolves of the Assembly (Nov. 8, 1775), reprinted in 8 PA. STAT., supra note 41,
at 492 (1902). For discussion, see MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 222;
Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1622-23.
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sociation in Pennsylvania," 127 "Articles of Association in Pennsylvania," 128 which129the Assembly "earnestly recommend[ed]" that all
"associators" sign,
and a special tax of two pounds and ten shillings
on all white males between the ages of sixteen and fifty who failed to
30
sign the Articles of Association.'
In 1776, at a convention almost entirely composed of the
Quakers' opponents,13 ' the revolutionaries wrote the same basic solution-conscientious objection subject to payment of an equivalentinto the state constitution:
That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion towards the expence of that protection,
and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent
thereto: But no part of a man's property can be justly taken from
him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of
his legal representatives: Nor can any man who is conscientiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will
pay such equivalent ....

132

Over the decades of this long political battle, supporters of a militia and opponents of an unconditional exemption made a wide variety
of arguments: that pacifism was a false religion, that 'Justice and equity" required service from all, that Quakers and their property would
benefit fully from the common defense provided by others, that refusal to serve in time of war struck at "the very Existence of Civil Government," that the religious liberty guarantee in Pennsylvania's
charter did not include exemption from military service, that some
Quakers had paid taxes for military measures and some had even
served in the military. 13 3 But I have found no mention of a claim that
unconditional exemption for Quakers would establish their religion,
support their religion, grant preference to their religion, or any other
such formulation-not in the substantial original sources I have been
127

Rules and Regulations for the Better Government of the Military Association in

Pennsylvania (Nov. 25, 1775), 8 PA.
128
129
130

STAT.,

supra note 41, at 499 (1902).

Id. at 506.
Id.
Resolutions Directing the Mode of Levying Taxes on Non-Associators in Penn-

sylvania § 8 (Nov. 25, 1775) [hereinafter 1775 Non-Associators Resolution], reprinted

in 8 PA. STAT., supra note 41, at 512, 514 (1902).
131 See FROST, supra note 42, at 64-65.
132 PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 LAws
STATES,

supanote 40, at 3081, 3083. For discussion of this provision, see

OF THE

FROST,

supra

note 42, at 65; Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1625-26.
133 For summaries of these debates, see FROST, supa note 42, at 29-43, 60-69;
Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1615-21; West, supa note 43, at 390-91.
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able to examine personally and not in extensive summaries and quotations by vigorous opponents of regulatory exemptions. 34 The many
petitions opposing the pacifist position did not even oppose exemptions outright. They uniformly urged that pacifists be required to provide more financial support to the military, but not that they be
I35
required to serve in the miltary.
Because the Quakers ultimately got considerably less than they
demanded, some opponents of exemptions claim the outcome in
Pennsylvania as a victory that shows the founding generation's opposition to exemptions. 136 But this badly mischaracterizes the political
outcome-pacifists were in fact exempted from military service. To
pay a financial "equivalent" was a burden, both on conscience and on
the pacifists' secular interests. But it was much less of a burden on
either than actual military service with the risk of killing or of being
killed. That is the commonsense understanding both in our time and
in theirs. Certainly in my generation, which was draft eligible during
the Vietnam War, both the government and potential draftees viewed
conscientious objector status as a real exemption, worth determined
litigation, I 37 despite the burdens of alternative service. The Court upheld statutory provisions awarding educational benefits to military veterans but not to those who performed civilian alternative service,
explaining in part that the burdens of military service were much
greater. 13 AndJustice Harlan, who had some sympathy with the argument that exemptions are an establishment, viewed conscientious objector status as a real exemption that squarely raised the

134 See Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1608-12, 1615-26; West, supra note 43, at
390-91.
135 For petitions against the pacifist position, see 8 ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at
7259-60, 7311-13, 7333-43, 7396-7410, 7422-23, 7425-26 (Charles F. Hoban ed.,
1935). Some of these petitions, and other similar petitions, are reprinted in
MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 246-47, 260-66, 307-10. Some are quoted in the
paragraphs that follow.
136 See Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1604-05, 1630-31; West, supra note 43, at
381-82.
137 See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971) (reviewing conviction of
Muhammad Ali for failing to report for induction after erroneous denial of conscientious objector claim). A Westlaw search for "selective service" and "conscientious objector" between 1964 and 1975, inclusive, reveals 32 cases in the Supreme Court and
1,389 in the "All Federal Cases" database.
138 SeeJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 378-82 (1974) (noting the rigors of military discipline and potential hazards of military duty).
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Establishment Clause issue,' 3 9 despite the requirement of alternative
service.
The revolutionary generation took a similar view. A petition of
officers of the Philadelphia Association, demanding that conscientious objectors pay an equivalent, argued that pacifists "may be exempted from actually bearing Arms; (and in such Case by paying a
Fine for such Exemption, he is in a better Situation than one who
risks his Life in the Service). ' 140 A month earlier these officers had
argued that nonpacifists would find it more attractive to pay the
equivalent than to serve in person: "People sincerely and religiously
scrupulous are but few in Comparison to those who upon this Occasion, as well as others, make Conscience a Convenience."14 1 A different
group of officers in 1776 argued that an Associator must pay for his
own equipment and "risk his Life," so that even with the equivalent,
the non-Associator had such a "great Advantage ... in Point of Interest [that it] would entirely defeat the Association, if the People in general were not actuated by a patriotic Spirit." 142 The privates of the
Philadelphia Association, in a petition endorsed by their officers, 143
argued that "no Terms of Exemption, affecting Property meerly, can
be deemed equal to the Risks and Dangers to which they expose
themselves who are under the most solemn Engagements of Honour
and Duty to lay down their Lives, if necessary, in Defence of their
Country.'

' 144

139 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 355-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also infra notes 246-250 and accompanying text (discussing Welsh).
140 A Memorial of the Officers of the Military Association of the City and Liberties
of Philadelphia (Oct. 31, 1775) [hereinafter Memorial of the Officers], in 8 ARCHIvES,
supra note 90, at 7337, 7339 (Charles F. Hoban ed., 1935).
141 Memorial from the Officers of the Military Association for the City and Liberties of Philadelphia (Sept. 27, 1775), in 8 ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at 7259, 7259
(Charles F. Hoban ed., 1935).
142 The Petition of Mark Bird, Daniel Broadhead, Balsar Geehr and Jonathan
Potts, Esquires, Field-Officers in the Several battalions in Berks County, in Behalf of
Said Battalions (Feb. 23, 1776), in 8 ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at 7399 (Charles F.
Hoban ed., 1935).
143 The Memorial of the Officers of the Military Association of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia (Feb. 17, 1776), in 8 ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at 7407 (Charles F.
Hoban ed., 1935) ("Sheweth, THAT your Memorialists have perused, at the Request of
the private Associators of this City and Liberties, their Petition to your Honourable
House, and concur with them in the Sentiments therein contained.").
144 The Petition of the Privates of the Military Association of the City and Liberties
of Philadelphia (Feb. 17, 1776) [hereinafter Petition of the Privates], in 8 ARCHIVES,
supra note 90, at 7402, 7403 (Charles F. Hoban ed., 1935).
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The financial equivalent was increased in response to such concerns, first to three pounds and ten shillings per year 145 and then to
double the normal rate of property tax. 146 Double property-tax was
imposed notjust on conscientious objectors, but on "every person not
subject to nor performing military duty"-thus including those who
were too old or disabled to serve-with exceptions for public officials,
clergy, and nuclear families with a member already serving or killed or
captured.147 These taxes were substantial, but they were not designed
to stamp out sincere claims of conscience. The privates of the Philadelphia Association argued that "the Terms imposed upon NonAssociators should be such as to induce every Man of suitable Age and
Strength (not truly conscientiously scrupulous) to join in the Association.''148 Scholars who have studied the question conclude that the
149
vast majority of members of the peace churches refused to serve,
and that most of those who did serve were attracted early by the revo1 50
lutionary cause, not coerced later by threats of fines.
Nor did opposition to military exemptions necessarily entail opposition to all exemptions. For reasons already stated, 15 1 military exemption is one of the hardest cases. Opposition to exemption in the
hardest case does not imply opposition in easier cases. This core of
this rather obvious idea appears in a statement of Rev. Francis Alison,
a mid-century Presbyterian leader. (Presbyterians tended to live on
the frontier, and had much at stake in opposition to pacifism.' 52 ) In a
1756 sermon, Alison said that "[a] 11... should have a free use of their
53
religion, but so as not on that score to burden or oppress others."1
This statement does not take a clear position on regulatory exemp145 See Resolutions Directing the Mode of Levying Taxes on Non-Associators § 8
(Apr. 5, 1776) [hereinafter 1776 Non-Associators Resolution], reprinted in 8 PA. STAT.,
supra note 41, at 538, 540-41 (1902).
146 See An Act for Making More Equal the Burden of the Public Defense and for
Filling the Quota of Troops To Be Raised in This State, ch. 773, § 1 (1777), reprinted
in9 PA. STAT., supra note 41, at 167 (1903).
147 See id. § 3.
148 Petition of the Privates, supra note 144, at 7404 (emphasis added).
149 See MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 300 (estimating that ninety-five percent of Mennonites and Amish refused to serve, and that all the peace churches refused to serve "with a degree of unanimity that would never be matched again in any
American war"); id. at 525 (reporting that Quaker meetings disowned Quakers who
served, and that those disowned for this cause were "an insignificant minority");
FROST, supra note 42, at 67 (stating that "a few Quakers" dissented from the teaching
on military service).
150 See MACMASTER ET AL., supra note 82, at 525.
151

152
153

See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
See FROST, supra note 42, at 51.
Id. (quoting Alison's 1756 "Love of Country" sermon).
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tions either way, but it does draw the essential distinction: protect religious liberty up to the point at which it burdens or oppresses others,
and no further. Some exemptions burden or oppress others; many do
not. The privates of the Philadelphia Association illustrated the distinction neatly; they wanted "all Persons alledging Scruples of Conscience" to take "a Test by Oath or Affirmation" to prove their
sincerity. 154 So they demanded an equivalent for exemption from military service, but were entirely comfortable with the exemption from
taking oaths. Similarly, when the state's revolutionary government imposed a loyalty oath, it provided for oath or affirmation. 155 More remarkably, Pennsylvania provided for conscientious objection by tax
assessors-public officials-who were subject to a fine of up to ten
pounds for failing to compile lists of white males of military age, "un15 6
less such assessor's refusal proceeds from conscientious motives."
Those who demanded an equivalent for military exemption in
157
Pennsylvania had to argue that the colony's Charter of Privileges
did not guarantee exemption without an equivalent. Even in that context, most of their arguments focused on the special cost of exemption from military service, and not on disputing a right to exemptions
more generally. A revolutionary committee of Philadelphia argued
that "Self-preservation is the first Principle of Nature," "that the Safety
154 Petition of the Privates, supra note 144, at 7406.
155 See An Act for the Further Security of the Government, ch. 796 (1778), reprinted in 9 PA. STAT., supra note 41, at 238 (1903); An Act Obliging the Male White
Inhabitants of This State To Give Assurances of Allegiance to the Same and for Other
Purposes Therein Mentioned, ch. 756 (1777), reprinted in 9 PA. STAT., supra note 41, at
110 (1903). The oath or affirmation required by the 1778 Act is reprinted in FROST,
supra note 42, at 67.
156 See 1776 Non-Associators Resolution, supra note 145, § 2, at 538, 540-41; 1775
Non-Associators Resolution, supra note 130, at 512, 514. The county commissioners
were then to appoint "some other proper person" to make out the list. See § 3 of
each Resolution.
157 Charter of Privileges Granted by William Penn, Esq. to the Inhabitants of
Pennsylvania and Territories art. I (1701), reprinted in 5 LAWS OF THE STATES, supra
note 40, at 3076, 3077. This guarantee stated:
I do hereby grant and declare, That no Person or Persons, inhabiting in this
Province or Territories, who shall confess and acknowledge One almighty
God, the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the World; and profess him or
themselves obliged to live quietly under the Civil Government, shall be in
any Case molested or prejudiced, in his or their Person or Estate, because of
his or their conscientious Persuasion or Practice, nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious Worship, Place or Ministry, contrary to his
or their Mind, or to do or suffer any other Act or Thing, contrary to his or
their Mind, or to do or suffer any other Act or Thing, contrary to their religious Persuasion.
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of the People is the supreme law," and "that the Doctrine of Passive
Obedience and Non-resistance is incompatible with our Freedom and
Happiness. " 1 58 The Philadelphia privates argued "that the great Law
of Self-preservation is equally binding with the Letter of written Charters. ' 159 They also said:
Liberty of Conscience is so sacred a Thing that it ought ever to be
preserved inviolate, and we will always rejoice to see any Body of
Men assert their Right to it. But when, under Pretence of this Liberty the very Existence of Civil Government is struck at, we beg
Leave to represent that either the Liberty claimed must be given up
16 0
or the Government dissolved.
In modern doctrinal terms, all these arguments would fit comfortably under the rubric of asserting a compelling governmental interest in military service. The Philadelphia privates also offered a
textual basis for this argument. In the paragraph following the passage just quoted, they noted that the persons protected by the charter's religious liberty clause "are by that very Clause made to 'profess
themselves obliged to live quietly under the civil Government,' which
cannot possibly be when they refuse to support the Measures often
necessary to its very Existence. '16 1 Professor Hamburger reads this as
embracing his argument that any violation of law was a breach of
peace that overrode state guarantees of religious liberty in the Founding era.' 62 Perhaps there were Philadelphians who would have accepted that argument, but that is not the argument the privates made.
The privates' argument did not concern just any breach of peace, but
only the refusal to support measures necessary to the government's
,'very existence."
There was also a textual argument that the religious liberty provision in Pennsylvania's charter could not be read to guarantee exemption from military service, because the colony's original charter
authorized William Penn to "levy, muster and train all Sorts of Men, of
what Condition soever, . . . and to make War," and to do these things
at a time when it was anticipated that Quakers would be the principal
158 The Petition and Remonstrance of the Committee of the City and Liberties of
Philadelphia (Oct. 31, 1775) [hereinafter City Committee], in 8 ARCHIVES, supra note
90, at 7334, 7336 (Charles F. Hoban ed., 1935).
159 A Representation from the Committee of Privates of the Association Belonging
to the City of Philadelphia, and Its Districts (Oct. 31, 1775) [hereinafter Representation of the Privates], in 8 ARCHIwES, supra note 90, at 7339, 7341 (Charles F. Hoban
ed., 1935).
160 Id. at 7341-42.
161

Id. at 7342.

162

See Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1620-21.

1824

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOIL. 81:5

settlers in the colony. 163 This too is an argument that reaches only to
exemption from military service.
On the other hand, one argument attacked the claim of a right to
exemptions quite generally. The Philadelphia officers argued that the
charter's guarantees of religious liberty "relate only to an Exemption
from any Acts of Uniformity in Worship, and from paying towards the
Support of other religious Establishments-than those to which the
Inhabitants of this Province respectively belong. 1 64 Moreover, this
narrow interpretation was arguably written into the general religious
liberty clause in Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution. 165 But if we are to
read the references to "religious worship" in that document as a telling restriction, we must give equal weight to the elimination of any
166
such restrictive references in Pennsylvania's 1790 Constitution.
The argument of the officers, and the subsequent evolution of
the state constitution's religious liberty clause, are relevant evidence
in the originalist debate about whether Pennsylvanians in the founding generation understood free exercise of religion to include a presumptive right to exemptions. But they are no evidence at all on the
principal question here-did Pennsylvanians understand the principles of disestablishment to preclude exemptions even when the political process was willing to grant them? Clearly they did not. They
granted exemption from military service, on condition of a financial
163 Representation of the Privates, supra note 159, at 7339, 7342-43 (quoting
Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania (1681), reprinted in 5 LAWS OF THE STATES,
supra note 40, at 3035, 3042). Substantially the same argument appears in City Committee, supra note 158, at 7334, 7335.
164 Memorial of the Officers, supra note 140, at 7338.
165 See PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. II, ("And that no authority
can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case
interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise
of religious worship."), reprintedin 5 LAWS OF THE STATES, supra note 40, at 3081, 3082.
Professor Hamburger reads this as a decisive rejection of a constitutional right to
exemptions from regulation of any conduct other than worship. See Hamburger,
supra note 87, at 1624-25. Judge McConnell finds no evidence that lawyers of the
time interpreted state freedom of worship clauses more narrowly than state free exercise clauses. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1461. This general religious liberty
clause was separate from the clause granting exemption from military service subject

to payment of an equivalent. See text accompanying supra note 132.
166 See PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3 (stating "that no human authority can, in
any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience"), reprinted in 5
LAWS OF THE STATES, supra note 40, at 3100. The separate provision conditionally

guaranteeing exemption from military service was also retained: "Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms shall not be compelled to do so, but shall pay an
equivalent for personal service." Id. art. VI, § 2, reprinted in 5 LAws OF THE STATES,
supra note 40, at 3081, 3099.

2006]

RELIGIOUS

EXEMPTIONS

AND

THE

ESTABLISHMENT

CLAUSE

1825

equivalent, and they never questioned the exemption from oath taking even at the height of the controversy and the resulting suspicion
of those who refused to serve.
Exemptions from military service were controversial, and rightly
so, because those exemptions imposed serious burdens on persons
outside the exempted faiths, and especially so in Pennsylvania, where
Quakers and other pacifist sects were a large minority of the population. But if exemptions were in principal an objectionable preference
for religion, the controversy should have extended to other exemptions as well. So far as we can tell, it did not.
States enacted other exemptions without leaving a record of similar debate. Exemptions from oath taking were not controversial by
the time of the Founding. Early in Pennsylvania's history, there was
substantial conflict over whether to require oaths of anybody, and
then whether to exempt Quakers from that requirement, but that conflict was resolved by 1724.167 The royal officials and local Anglicans
insisting on oaths in those early days would not have been concerned
about establishment of religion. Elsewhere in the colonies, and certainly in the period of broad movements for disestablishment, "oath
taking never became a serious source of conflict with the authorities." 168 This absence of recorded controversy is evidence that no substantial body of opinion thought that exemptions from oath-taking
raised an issue of establishment.
With respect to the exemptions from paying taxes for the established church, the focus of debate was on whether the tax should be
continued at all, whether members of minority faiths should have to
pay taxes to their own church, and whether the exemptions were fairly
administered. 169 No one appears to have thought that exemptions
made things worse, or that exemptions established a religion. The
question was whether exemptions were enough.
B. JudicialDebates
Early in the nineteenth century, there was litigation over constitutional claims to exemptions not enacted by the legislature. Here too I
have found almost no evidence of anyone arguing that exemptions
established religion. Some lawyers argued against exemptions, and
some judges ruled against exemptions, but only one lawyer appears to
have argued-briefly and unsuccessfully-that exemptions might violate a state or federal establishment clause.
167

168
169

See FROST, supra note 42, at 23-25.
CURRY, supra note 23, at 81.
See id. at 163-92; Esbeck, supra note 45, at 1434-37, 1440-47.
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John Gibson, Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, whose opinions are
commonly cited as early rejections of any claim to a constitutional
right to regulatory exemptions, said clearly that such exemptions
could be allowed by legislators, or even by judges in cases properly
within judicial discretion. In Philips v. Gratz,170 a Jewish plaintiff
17 1
sought a continuance when his case was called for trial on Saturday.
172
The motion was denied, the case was tried, and plaintiff appealed.
Chief Justice Gibson wrote:
The religious scruples of persons concerned with the administration of justice will receive all the indulgence that is compatible
with the business of government; and had circumstances permitted
it, this cause would not have been ordered for trial on the Jewish
Sabbath. But when a continuance for conscience' sake is claimed as
a right, and at the expense of a term's delay, the matter assumes a
17 3
different aspect.

He thus held that the state constitution did not require exemption, but he was equally clear in his view that it did not prohibitexemption. He made the same point later in the opinion, criticizing a New
York decision protecting the confidentiality of a Catholic confession. 174 ChiefJustice Gibson said he supported "the policy of protecting the secrets of auricular confession. But considerations of policy
address themselves with propriety to the legislature, and not to a
magistrate."1

75

Counsel for the defendant, arguing against the exemption, did
not claim otherwise. They urged that an exemption would be unworkable, and that the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty was confined to "faith and religious worship" and did not affect "performance
of a civil duty." 176 But they did not suggest that an exemption would
establish anyone's religion.
Similarly in other cases, to the extent we have either an opinion
of the court or an argument of counsel opposing a claimed exemption, there is little suggestion that the legislature could not provide
exemptions or that such legislative exemptions would establish a relig170 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831).
171 Id. at 412.
172 Id. at 412-13.
173 Id. at 416.
174 Id. at 417.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 415. They made this argument under the 1790 constitution, which had
eliminated the language that seemed to expressly limit protection to worship. See
supra notes 165-66 (comparing the text of Pennsylvania's 1776 and 1790
constitutions).
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court af-

firmed the conviction of a Jew for working on Sunday. 1 78 The court
rejected his claim that the conviction violated his religious liberty, 179
principally on the ground that despite his contrary representations,
his religion did not require him to work on Sunday. Nothing in the
opinion hints that a contrary judgment would have established a
religion.
In Commonwealth v. Drake,180 an early Massachusetts case, a criminal defendant sought a new trial on the ground that the state had
introduced evidence of his penitential confession to members of his
church. 18 I The state successfully argued that the confession was voluntary and reliable, that it had not been required by any ecclesiastical
rule of his faith, and that its admission in evidence violated "no legal
or constitutional principle."1 8 2 The state did not argue, and the court
did not suggest, that a rule excluding the evidence would establish a
religion.
In State v. Willson, I8 3 defendant refused to serve on a grand jury.
The case appears to have been a test case on behalf of a Christian
denomination known as Covenanters, who viewed jury service as an
offense to God. We do not have the argument for the state, and there
may not have been one. South Carolina's Constitutional Court of Appeals rejected defendant's claim, principally on the ground that it
would be impossible to detect false claims, so that the benefit of exemptions would be "not so much for the scrupulous as for those who
have no scruples." 18 4 There is no hint of an Establishment Clause argument, and the negation of such an argument is implied: the court
spoke with apparent approval of cases in which members of the sect
appeared for duty, and "were readily excused" when the court found
85
that more than enough jurors were available.'
The only exception I have encountered is a brief and conclusory
passage in the prosecutor's argument in People v. Philips.I 86 This is the
177

3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817).

178
179

Id. at 48-50.
Id. at 49-50.

180

15 Mass. 161 (14 Tyng) (1818).

181
182

Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.

183

13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 393 (1823).

184
185

Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.

People v. Philips, (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. June 14, 1813), reprinted in SAMPSON,
31, at 9, and excerpts reprinted in MICHAEL MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 103 (2nd ed. 2006). More extensive excerpts are reprinted in
Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAw. 199 (1955).
186

supra note
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New York case in which the state sought to compel a Catholic priest to
testify to what he learned in the confessional. 187 Mostly the prosecutor argued that New York's guarantee of freedom of worship did not
excuse the performance of civic duties. 188 But he also said, in a single
passing sentence, that "whenever any one shall claim to do what may
justly offend the others, he claims an unequal, and so an unconstitutional 'preference."' 18 9 There it is-the heart of the modern Establishment Clause argument in a single unelaborated phrase.
The argument did not succeed. The court interpreted the New
York Constitution in a quite modern way that sounds much like the
compelling interest test. The state constitutional exception, permitting regulation of religion in cases of "licentiousness, of practices inconsistent with the tranquillity and safety of the state," "has reference to
something actually, not negatively injurious. To acts committed, not
to acts omitted-offences of a deep dye, and of an extensively injurious nature."' 9 0 The court did not use the phrase "compelling government interest," but the idea is plainly similar. In the court's view, free
exercise required regulatory exemptions, and the argument that the
commitment to disestablishment might prohibit them did not deserve
a response.
There is a similar holding, a good bit later than the other cases
discussed, from a Virginia trial court in Commonwealth v. Cronin.l9 1
There the defendant, who had fatally beaten his wife, called her priest
as a witness and asked if she had admitted to adultery in her final
confession. 192 The court held, in a substantial opinion, that compelling the priest to testify would have the effect of suppressing a sacrament of the Catholic faith, and that constitutional guarantees of
religious liberty clearly precluded such a result. 19 3 There is no reference to any Establishment Clause argument. But the prosecutor apparently did argue that exempting Catholic priests "would be
extending to them a privilege not enjoyed by clergymen of the protestant persuasion."' 19 4 There is no indication that this argument was
rooted in the state's establishment clause; in any event, the argument
of discrimination between two religions, based on the principle that
all faiths must be treated equally, is very different from the modern
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

supra note 186, at 103-04.
Id. at 104-06.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 108 (emphasis added by court).
1 Q.LJ. 128 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1856).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 133-42.
Id. at 140.
MCCONNELL ET AL.,
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argument that religious exemptions discriminate against activities that
are in no sense religious. 19 5 The court found the argument "scarcely
. . . necessary to notice;" Protestants had no practice analogous to

Catholic confession, and when the law deprived Protestants of one of
19 6
their sacraments, they too would be exempt.
Finally, and also rather late in the day, there is the litigation that
culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Permoli v. Municipality
No. 1.197 This was a challenge to a New Orleans ordinance prohibiting
Catholic funerals except at a designated mortuary chapel. On its face,
the ordinance was not generally applicable and thus did not really
present an exemption issue. But the city argued that in effect it was
generally applicable, because it was a health measure to prevent the
spread of yellow fever, 198 and only Catholics held open-casket funerals. 199 The city argued that the ordinance was justified by "necessity,"'2° and that it did not violate Catholic conscience because the
practice of holding funerals in the cathedral was merely a matter of
"discipline," not of "dogma."20

1

(This argument that the claimant

does not understand his own religion, which appeared here and in
Commonwealth v. Wolf 2 0 2 is a remarkably common way of trying to
duck the exemptions issue.) Finally, and decisively, the city argued
that there was no federal issue, because the First Amendment did not
apply to the states and because earlier federal guarantees of religious
liberty in Louisiana (in legislation incorporating the Northwest Ordinance, implementing the treaty by which the territory was acquired
from France, and authorizing citizens of the territory to form a state
government) had lapsed when Louisiana became a state. 20 3 Once
again, there is no hint of anything like an argument that exempting
Catholics from a general policy would raise an issue of establishment.
It is hard to prove a negative. It is hard to prove that no one
believed a proposition that was never advanced and thus drew no re195 The case of religion-like commitments with nontheistic foundations is explored infra in text at notes 246-52.
196 Cronin, 1 Q.LJ. at 140.
197 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
198 See id. at 600.
199 See id. at 601. It would not be learned until the early twentieth century that
yellow fever is spread by mosquitos and not by dead bodies. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH,
THE PATH BETWEEN THE SEAS 142-45, 409-15, 421-23, 465-68 (1977) (tracing pro-

gress from the filth and dead-body theories of the nineteenth century to the elimination of yellow fever from the Panama Canal project in 1905).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 603.
202 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817); see supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
203 Permoli, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 606-08.
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buttals. But these legislative and judicial debates are obvious places
where the Establishment Clause argument should have appeared if
anyone believed it, or if anyone had even thought of it. Except for
what amounts to a throw-away line in the prosecutor's argument in
People v. Philips,20 4 the New York confessional case, the argument simply does not appear. The argument appears to have been generally
unimagined in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.
C.

Other Scholarly Treatments of Founding-EraDebates

The scholars who argue that regulatory exemptions are an establishment are not originalists. 20 5 There is a substantial originalist debate over whether regulatory exemptions are constitutionally required,
in which historically-minded opponents of exemptions have argued
that exemptions were not required by the original understanding.
But none of those scholars has seriously argued that regulatory exemptions were forbidden by the original understanding, and none has
cited a single instance of anyone in the founding generation arguing
that regulatory exemptions were unconstitutional. Rather, their position is that exemptions were commonly granted but were thought to
be a matter of legislative grace.
Ellis West acknowledges that "exemptions from conscription laws
were often granted to religious conscientious objectors before, during, and after the Revolution;" he attributes this to legislative "sympathy." 206 Philip Hamburger argues: "[T] hat various state statutes (or
even constitutions) expressly granted religious exemptions from military service and other specified civil obligations hardly suggests that
20 7
such exemptions were rights under the United States Constitution.
Gerard Bradley makes an impassioned conceptual and originalist case
against regulatory exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, but insists that "[n]othing in this idea (and nothing in the Constitution)
prohibits relief from neutral, generally applicable laws for conscien208
tious objectors by legislative accommodation."
The only historically-minded scholar who has in any way attempted to link regulatory exemptions to establishment is Philip
Hamburger. In his most recent work, Hamburger concludes that religious exemptions do not generally violate the federal Establishment
204 See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (discussing Philips).
205 See supra note 12.
206 West, supra note 43, at 375.
207 Hamburger, supra note 6, at 948.
208 Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 262 (1991).
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Clause. 20 9 So perhaps his earlier work is best read as claiming only
that some key participants in eighteenth-century debates argued or
believed that exemptions were establishments. But even this claim
would go far beyond his evidence.
Hamburger notes that religious dissenters attacking the privileges
of the established church often argued for equal rights for all
faiths. 2 10 Then he claims that this equal-rights argument "had implications for exemption," 211 because exemptions "could create unequal
civil rights. ' 21 2 But this is Hamburger talking, not anyone from the
eighteenth century. He has few examples of anyone attacking exemptions on these grounds-none that do so unambiguously and none
that connect such an attack to an establishment of religion.
Hamburger himself acknowledges elsewhere that proponents of religious liberty often clarified broad rhetoric about equal rights and opposition to laws taking cognizance of religion, insisting that
government must also protect free exercise. 21 3 And just as legislators
could grant exemptions and support them on policy grounds without
believing they were constitutionally required-Hamburger's principal
point-so critics could oppose exemptions on policy grounds without
believing they were constitutionally prohibited.
Hamburger's effort to link exemptions with establishment gets
no support from the few examples of eighteenth-century views in his
footnotes. To show that Presbyterians might have opposed exemptions, he quotes a 1777 memorial of Virginia Presbyterians stating that
"the concerns of religion, are beyond the limits of civil control," and
that accordingly, the church should not "receive any emoluments
' 21 4
from any human establishments for the support of the gospel.
Hamburger takes this quotation out of context; the Memorial was opposing the proposed general assessment, a tax for the support of
Christian clergy of all denominations. 2 15 The entire Memorial is devoted to the "the propriety of a general assessment, or whether every
religious society shall be left to voluntary contributions for the mainte209 See Hamburger, supra note 87, at 1607 n.8 ("[T]he establishment clause permits at least some legislative exemptions.").
210 Hamburger, supra note 6, at 946.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 947.
213 Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Centuy Debate About
Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SuP. CT. REv. 295, 343-45.
214 Hamburger, supra note 6, at 946 n.117 (quoting Memorial of the Presbytery of
Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia (Apr. 25, 1777) [hereinafter Memorial
of Virginia Presbyterians], reprinted in WILLIAM ADDISON BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 96, 98 (photo. reprint 2000) (1911)).
215 Memorial of Virginia Presbyterians, supra note 214, at 96-99.

1832

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 81:5

nance of the ministers of the gospel who are of different persuasions." 2 16 Indeed, the Memorial says that this issue is the only reason
the Memorial was prepared. 21 7 The immediate context of
Hamburger's quotation is also about the assessment, as the sentences
immediately proceeding that quotation make clear:
Neither does the church of Christ stand in need of a general assessment for its support; and most certain we are that it would be of no
advantage, but an injury to the society to which we belong; and as
every good Christian believes that Christ has ordained a complete
system of laws for the government of his kingdom, so we are persuaded that by his providence, he will support it to its final consummation. In the fixed belief of this principle, that the kingdom of
Christ, and the concerns of religion, are beyond the limits of civil
control, we should act a dishonest, inconsistent part, were we to receive any emoluments from any human establishments for the sup2 18
port of the gospel.
"Emoluments" thus has its customary meaning of "[p]rofit or
gain arising from station, office, or employment; dues; reward, remuneration, salary." 2 19 The quotation is about money; it has nothing to
do with regulatory exemptions.
"Emoluments" once had a second meaning, now long obsolete,
of "advantage, benefit, comfort." 220 The Oxford English Dictionary cites
examples from 1633 to 1756, all suggesting physical comforts, not legal privileges. 22 1 We may see a lingering example of this usage in the
other quotation Hamburger offers. He quotes the Baptist leaderJohn
Leland as the only pastor of the time to criticize the exemption of the
clergy from taxation and military service. 2 22 Hamburger quotes the
italicized portion of the following passage in Leland's most famous
sermon against establishments, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable22 3 :
Ministers should share the same protection of the law that other
men do, and no more. To proscribe them from seats of legislation,
216 Id. at 97.
217 Id. ("We would therefore have given our honorable Legislature no further
trouble on this subject, but we are sorry to find that there yet remains a variety of
opinions touching the propriety of a general assessment ..
218 Id. at 98.
219 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 182 (2d ed. 1989) (collecting examples
from 1480 to 1881).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Hamburger, supra note 6, at 947 n.l 19.
223 John Leland, The Rights of Consciencelnalienable(1791), in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 1079, 1083-99 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d
ed. 1998).
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&c. is cruel. To indulge them with an exemption from taxes and bearing
arms is a tempting emolument. The law should be silent about them; protect
them as citizens (not as sacred officers) for the civil law knows no sacred
224
religious officers.

"Emolument" here may refer to the financial benefit of tax exemption, the physical benefit of exemption from military service, or both.
The important point is that these clergy exemptions were based on
religious status, not on any religious belief that prevented compliance
with the law. Few if any clergy conscientiously objected to taxes other
than the tax for the established church, and few clergy outside the
225
historic peace churches conscientiously objected to military service.
2
26
Yet all got the exemptions, simply because of their occupation.
As
Justice O'Connor has explained, the fundamental distinction between
status and belief helps reconcile regulatory exemptions with a strong
principle of religious equality:
What makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is not
that the government is making life easier for some particular religious group as such. Rather, it is that the government is accommodating a deeply held belief. Accommodations may thus justify
treating those who share this belief differently from those who do
227
not; but they do not justify discriminations based on sect.
This distinction was not developed in the eighteenth century, but
something like it may have been implicit, reconciling the common
rhetoric of equal rights with the common practice of exemptions for
conscientious objectors. This implicit distinction could explain why
the religious minorities that demanded equal rights for all faiths did
not oppose regulatory exemptions on that ground, and why John Leland attacked privileges for the clergy as such on establishmentsounding grounds but made no such attack on conscientious
objectors.
224 Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
225 The issue did not arise, because the clergy were exempt without regard to conscience. But in an era when denominational differences were much sharper than
today, it would have been almost unimaginable for a pacifist clergyman to lead a
nonpacifist church.
226 See, e.g.,
An Act for Forming, Regulating, and Conducting the Military Force of
This State, reprinted in CONNECTICUT LAws, supra note 47, at 144, 144 (exempting
"Ministers of the Gospel"); An Act To Regulate the Militia of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, ch. 750, § 2 (1777) (exempting "ministers of the gospel (or clergy)"),
reprinted in 9 PA. STAT., supra note 41, at 75, 77 (1903). Despite the difficulty of answering Leland's objection, clergy are still exempt from military service in the existing
stand-by draft legislation. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 4 56(g) (2000).
227 Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
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The very sermon Hamburger quotes illustrates the distinction between exemptions based on belief and exemptions based on status.
Leland attacked the Connecticut tax for the support of the clergy as
an establishment. 22 8 Protestant dissenters were exempt from paying
this tax, and Leland also attacked that exemption. 229 But he did not
attack the exemption as an establishment; he attacked it as not going far
enough. 230 It presumed the power to tax,2 31 it treated the exemption
as an indulgence rather than a right,2 32 and it required the dissenters
claiming the exemption to submit certificates to examination by the
justice of the peace, thus submitting a religious matter to civil authority. 23 3 He attacked the failure to exempt Jews, Catholics, Turks, and
"heathens."' 234 And he proposed that the consciences of both sides
could be satisfied by reversing the burden of registering one's beliefby taxing all those who submitted their names as believing in the tax,
and exempting all those who expressed their conscientious objection
by doing nothing:
It is likely that one part of the people in Connecticut believe in
conscience that gospel preachers should be supported by the force
of law; and the other part believe that it is not in the province of
civil law to interfere or any ways meddle with religious matters. How
are both parties to be protected by law in their conscientious belief?
Very easily. Let all those whose consciences dictate that they ought
to be taxed by law to maintain their preachers bring in their names
to the society-clerk by a certain day, and then assess them all, according to their estates, to raise the sum stipulated in the contract
[between each church and its pastor]; and all others go free. Both
parties by this method would enjoy the full liberty of conscience
without oppressing one another, the law use no force in matters of
conscience, the evil of Rhode-Island [where contracts to pay the
clergy were widely believed to be unenforceable] law be escaped,
and no persons could find fault with it (in a political point of view)
but those who fear the consciences of too many would lie dormant,
23 5
and therefore wish to force them to pay.
This is unambiguously a proposal for a tax with an exemption based
on conscientious belief, although implemented in a way that maxi228 Leland, supra note 223, at 1092-98.
229 Id. at 1092-95.
230
231
232
233
234
235

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1094.
1094.
1092.
1097.
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mizes both the liberty of the religious dissenters and the opportunity
for false claims. Perhaps it was sarcastic, meant to illustrate the unworkability of any defensible scheme of taxation to support religion.
But whether serious or sarcastic, neither this proposal nor Leland's
undoubtedly serious attack on the narrowness of the then-existing exemption is consistent with a view that exemptions impermissibly establish the exempted religion.
Hamburger would dismiss the exemption from the church tax as
irrelevant. He would distinguish exemption from a law that was religious in purpose and effect, from the perspective of majority and dissenters alike, from a law that-at least from the perspective of the
majority-was wholly secular and religiously neutral. 236 It is true that
Americans eventually rejected the tax for the established church as
illegitimate. But for much of the eighteenth century, Americans in
states with established churches viewed those taxes as wholly legitimate, and simultaneously enacted exemptions for religious dissenters. 2 37 These exemptions may have been the most attractive case, or
the most easily understood, but it is anachronistic not to view them as
genuine exemptions.
The exemption question was not near the center of Leland's concerns, because Baptists had no need of exemptions beyond exemption
from the tax for the established church and exemption from laws licensing the clergy. 238 These laws could be repealed entirely-and
eventually were. Leland apparently believed, consistent with a focus
on laws such as these, that human affairs could be divided into a domain of conscience and a domain of civil society, with no overlap. In
such a world, exemptions would not be needed to protect conscience,
and should not be allowed from laws in the proper domain of civil
society. 239 He did not define the two domains. In one sermon he said
236
237
238

Hamburger, supra note 6, at 930-31.
See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
See RALPH KETCHAM,JAMES MADISON 54-58 (1971) (describingJames Madison's
complaints about these laws shortly before the Revolution); ANSON PHELPS STOKES, 1
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 369 (1950) (describing the effect on Baptists of Virginia's licensing laws); McConnell, supra note 16, at 2165-66 (same).
239 JACK Nips UOHN LELAND], THE YANKEE SPY 19 (Boston, John Asplund 1794).
It is often the case, that laws are made which prevent the liberty of conscience; and because men cannot stretch their consciences, like a nose of
wax, these nonconformists are punished as vagrants that disturb the peace.
The complaint is, "These men, being Jews, do exceedingly trouble the city."
Let any man read the laws that were made about Daniel and the three children, and see who were the aggressors, the law makers or the law breakers.
The rights of conscience should always be considered inalienable-religious
opinions as not the objects of civil government, nor any ways under itsjuris-
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that a person's conscience governs "all his actions," 2 40 but in another

he arguably equated conscience with worship. 241 Of course, even worship falls on the action side of the belief/action distinction; the three
most recent free exercise cases in the Supreme Court all involved prohibited acts of worship. 24 2 We know that he opposed exemptions
from laws on murder and battery, 243 but those are easy cases then and
now. We do not know whether he thought that religious liberty for
Quakers should include exemptions from serving in the military, taking oaths, or removing their hats in court.
Leland's statements about freedom of conscience, like many similar statements on both sides from the same era, are ultimately ambiguous on the difference between protecting only belief and worship, or
protecting other religiously motivated conduct as well. So I do not
claim that Leland affirmatively supported a right to religious exemptions from laws regulating conduct, even where the exempted conduct would do little or no harm to others. I do claim that there is not
the slightest evidence that he opposed such exemptions as unconstitutional, and that his opposition to exemptions based on one's status as
a clergyman, which may well have been grounded in his opposition to
establishments, is no evidence of a similarly grounded opposition to
exemptions based on conscience. Hamburger's quotations simply do
not support his claim that eighteenth-century advocates of religious
liberty thought that exemptions for conscience sake raised issues of
establishment.
There were nearly four million Americans alive in the 1780s.
Somewhere, sometime, someone might have said something condemning regulatory exemptions as an establishment-something
more than a passing reference from a single prosecutor who lost his
case a quarter century after ratification. Another such quote might
diction; laws should only respect civil society; then if men are disturbers they
ought to be punished.
Id.
240 Leland, supra note 223, at 1085.
241 LELAND, supra note 239, at 19 ("[W] hen a man is a peaceable subject of state,
he should be protected in worshiping the Deity according to the dictates of his own
conscience.").
242 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211,
1216-18 (2006) (protecting consumption of hoasca, an herbal tea that contains a controlled substance, in a worship service); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524-25 (1993) (protecting sacrifice of animals in a worship
service); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874-76 (1990) (refusing to protect
consumption of peyote, a controlled substance, in a worship service).
243

LELAND, supra note 239, at 18.
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surface, or even more than one. But it is clear that such views were no
significant part of the Founding-era debate on religious liberty.
IV.

FROM ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING TO THE PRESENT

This original understanding helps explain and confirm both
American practice and Supreme Court precedent. From the late seventeenth century to the present, there is an unbroken tradition of
legislatively enacted regulatory exemptions. James Ryan, using a Lexis
search and sampling techniques, estimated that there were 2000 religious exemptions on state and federal statute books in 1992.244 The
idea that these exemptions may violate the Establishment Clause is of
modern origin, perhaps first seriously suggested by Philip Kurland in
1962.245
244 James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1445 & n.215 (1992). His search method appears to
have included tax exemptions as well as regulatory exemptions.
245 See KURLAND, supra note 12, at 17-18, 40-41, 111-12. The argument also appears in highly conclusory fashion-in a single phrase-in the unsuccessful argument
of the prosecutor in People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess.June 14, 1813). See supra note
189 and accompanying text.
A related, but different argument appeared in the World War I draft cases. In
World War I, the exemption from military service was limited to members "of any
well-recognized religious sect or organzation at present organized and existing and
whose existing creed or principles forbids its members to participate in war in any
form" and who personally shared that tenet of the organization's creed. Selective
Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78. The famous anarchist Emma Goldman,
prosecuted for giving speeches and distributing literature that allegedly induced men
not to register for the draft, argued that this exemption provision discriminated on
the basis of denomination and established the preferred denominations. Brief on
Behalf of the Plaintiffs in Error at 33-40, Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474
(1918) (No. 702). An amicus brief argued that the provision denied free exercise of
religion to conscientious objectors in unexempted denominations or with nontheistic
moral commitments. Brief of Walter Nelles, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S.
480 (1918) (No. 656). These arguments would have to be taken quite seriously today
under cases rigorously enforcing the constitutional ban on denominational discrimination. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of
the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-05 (1994) (invalidating statute that relieved burden on one religious group with no mechanism to
assure similar relief to any other religious group similary situated); see also Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-44 (1970) (plurality opinion) (construing statutory
exemption from military service to include nontheistic objectors); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-85 (1965) (same). But in 1918, the Court summarily rejected both the establishment and free exercise arguments as unworthy of discussion.
Goldman, 245 U.S. at 476; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918). For
brief accounts of Emma Goldman and the Selective Draft Law Cases, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARs 65-67, 270-71 (1997).
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Justice Harlan adopted a version of the argument in his concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States.246 He would have permitted
Congress to exempt men with deeply held conscientious objection to
military service, but he would not have permitted Congress to exempt
objectors who based their moral objection on some form of traditional religion without also exempting those who based their equally
deep moral objection on some form of secular philosophy. 247 But
where Congress attempted to exempt only the former, his remedy
would have been to extend the exemption to include the latter as
well.

24 8

I have no fundamental quarrel with Harlan's position on this issue, although I would prefer a different explanation for his result. I
have long urged that given the current distribution of religious opinion, exemptions should extend to the deep-seated moral objections of
those who reject traditional religious teachings. 249 This result is most
easily reached by taking a broadly inclusive view of what counts as religion, including both affirmative and negative answers to the great
250
religious questions-essentially by the plurality's route in Welsh
rather than by Justice Harlan's, although either route will suffice. Persons with sufficiently deep moral objections to a law are similarly situated with traditional religious objectors; persons with other kinds of
objections to a law are not.
My disagreement is with those who would interpret religion narrowly and traditionally, and who would also reject Harlan's remedy for
too-narrow exemption laws, and who would then invalidate religious
exemptions as discriminatory. Judges and others who combine these
three positions would deny religious liberty to the overwhelming majority of conscientious objectors because of such judges' own refusal to
protect the small minority of equally conscientious objectors whose
objection is based on a belief that doesn't seem to fit traditional or
conventional understandings of religion. 25 1 The best solution is to exempt all conscientious objectors (always subject to the compelling in246
247
248
249

398 U.S. at 356-67 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See id. at 356-61.
See id. at 361-67.
See Laycock, supranote 13, at 1002; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty,
7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 326-37 (1996).
250 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335-44 (plurality opinion) (concluding, despite restrictive
statutory language, that Welsh's deeply held moral convictions were religious). To
similar effect, see Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173-85 (treating as religious those beliefs that
occupy, in the life of a nontheist, a place parallel to that occupied by God in the life
of a traditional believer).
251 See Laycock, supra note 249, at 336-37.
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terest exception), whether religious or nonreligious by traditional
theistic conceptions. The second-best solution is to protect at least
the great majority of conscientious objectors who are traditionally religious; this "majority" is a diffuse and disparate majority of a generally
small minority holding deep moral objections to laws with majority
support. The worst outcome is to deny protection to all conscientious
objectors because legislators and judges find it difficult to explicitly
extend protection to a small number of the hardest cases.
Some readers may find this a surprise ending. What is the difference between my saying that the right to religious exemptions should
be extended to nontheists with deep-seated moral objections, and
others saying that exemptions exclusively for religious believers violate
the Establishment Clause? Both positions have some basis in the principle of neutrality between different religious beliefs. But they differ
in two important ways. The Establishment Clause argument, at least
as it has been presented in recent litigation, tends to take a much
broader view of who is discriminated against. Some proponents of the
Establishment Clause argument-not all-appear to believe that an
exemption for Sabbath observers establishes religion because there is
no exemption for football fans or for parents having trouble finding
child care. But I would extend exemptions only to persons whose
claim is sufficiently analogous to what all would agree is a religion. In
the absence of a theistic belief or a nontheistic organization or tradition that is functioning like a religion (such as Buddhism), that analogy can be made out only by a deep-seated moral commitment-not
by just any other highly desired Saturday activity.
More fundamentally, the opponents of exemptions let the principle of formal neutrality toward religion swallow a second principle
practiced at the founding: that legislators could exempt religious objectors from regulation. The problem of the secular conscientious objector did not exist in the Founders' time. Now that such objectors
exist, the solution is to extend the exemption principle to include
them, not to repeal the exemption principle because the neutrality
principle has become more difficult to implement. I have made the
normative argument for regulatory exemptions elsewhere and will not
repeat it here. 25 2 But the claim that the emergence of a significant
secular minority makes it unconstitutional for legislatures to exempt
religious practices from regulation would turn the Religion Clauses
on their head, treating increased opposition to religious belief and
believers as in itself a reason that requires government to restrict legis252

See, e.g., id. at 316-26, 347-48; Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,

1990 SuP. CT. Rv. 1, 10-68.
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lative protection for the religious liberty of those believers-when increased opposition to a group should more properly be a reason for
vigilance in protecting the liberties of that group.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is deeply divided on the question of whether
253
regulatory exemptions are sometimes constitutionally required.
But since the retirement of Justice Harlan, the Court has repeatedly
been unanimous in support of the general view that regulatory exemptions are constitutionally permitted. 2 54 The Court first seriously
addressed the issue in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 255 unani-

mously upholding a provision exempting religious organizations from
256
a federal prohibition on religious discrimination in employment.
The most recent example is Cutter v. Wilkinson,25 7 unanimously rejecting Establishment Clause challenges to the prison provisions of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) .258
253 Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537-44 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring), with id. at 544-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
254 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-26 (2005); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 705-06 (1994); id. at 711-12 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 715-16
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 722-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 743-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990); id. at 893-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-39 (1987); id. at 340-46 (Brennan,J., concurring); id. at 346
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 348-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Boerne,
521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing, without mention of
his opinion in Grumet or the opinions he joined in Amos and Smith, that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 (2000), establishes religion by preferring churches to art galleries).
255 483 U.S. 327.
256 See id. at 334 ("'This Court has long recognized that the government may (and
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.'" (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987))); id. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that "substantial potential for chilling religious activity ...justifies a categorical
exemption for nonprofit activities" of religious organizations); id. at 346 (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (upholding the exemption "[e]ssentially for the reasons" stated by
Justice O'Connor); id. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he objective observer
should perceive the Government [exemption] as an accommodation of the exercise
of religion rather than as a Government endorsement of religion.").
257 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
258 See id. at 719-26 (holding that RLUIPA § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000), appropriately lifts burdens on the free exercise of religion without unduly burdening
others and without discriminating among faiths).
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Of course there are limits to this rule. Regulatory exemptions are
invalid if they are "absolute" and "take [ ] no account" of burdens on
others in particular applications, 2 59 or if they are confined to a single
sect, 260 or to a single religious practice in a context where other religious practices are equally relevant to the exemption. 261 The Court
invalidated a tax exemption because in the plurality's view there was
no burden on religious exercise to be relieved and the cost of the
exemption burdened other taxpayers, 26 2 or because, in the more convincing view of a concurring opinion, the exemption created a
content-discriminatory tax on the press. 26 3 But nothing in these cases
supports any version of the claim that regulatory exemptions are
facially, generally, or usually invalid. To the contrary, in two of these
cases limiting the reach of exemptions, large majorities made a point
of reaffirming the constitutionality of legislation exempting religious
practices from burdensome regulation-eight justices in Texas
Monthly v. Bullock 264 and nine justices in Board of Education v.
Grumet265 (perhaps more commonly known as KiryasJoel). EveryJustice said it again in Employment Division v. Smith, 266 the case that limited free exercise claims to exemptions. And as already noted, 267 they
unanimously so held in Amos and Cutter.
259 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985).
260 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-05 (1994).
261 See Thornton, 472 U.S. at 711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
262 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18-19 & n.8 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
263 Id. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring); see id. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
264 See id at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion) (approving Amos); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (approving Amos); id. at 38-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that regulatory and tax exemptions are generally permitted and sometimes required). Justice
White's brief concurrence said nothing about the exemption issue one way or the
other. See id. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring).
265 See 512 U.S. at 705 (stating that "the Constitution allows the state to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens;" reaffirming Amos); id. at 711-12
(Stevens, J., concurring) (distinguishing the facts of Grumet from "a decision to grant
an exemption from a burdensome general rule"); id. at 716 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Constitution permits 'nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption[s]"
(quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (emphasis by Justice
O'Connor)); id. at 723-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (approving Amos and similar
cases); id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has . . . long acknowledged the
permissibility of legislative accommodation.").
266 See 494 U.S. at 890 ("a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted"); id. at 893-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that regulatory exemptions for religious exercise are constitutionally required).
267 See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
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The argument that regulatory exemptions implicate the Establishment Clause is relatively new. It grows from misapplication of attempts to summarize the principles of disestablishment and free
exercise in the broad language of neutrality. But if ripped from context and historical roots, such broad language can suggest results inconsistent with those underlying principles.
As understood by those in the founding generation who labored
in the states on behalf of disestablishment, there was a material difference between support for organized religion (establishment, and a
threat to religious liberty) and exemption for religious practice (liberty enhancing, whether or not required by free exercise). Exemptions are not a way of expanding the power of the dominant religion;
they are a way of protecting religions that lack the political power to
prevent legislation that imposes substantial burdens on their religious
practice. Government support makes a religion better off than it
would have been if government had done nothing; regulatory exemptions relieve burdens imposed by government and leave the religion's
adherents no better off than if government had not imposed the burden in the first place. Government does not establish a religion by
leaving it alone. And there is no evidence the Founders thought
otherwise.

